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PRAGMATISM, PATERNALISM, AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL
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Allen Rostron†
INTRODUCTION
As the summer of 2012 began, Americans faced an array of gravely
serious issues. National elections in Greece could soon determine whether
Europe’s debt crisis triggered a worldwide financial collapse.1 Presidential
campaigns were underway in the United States as well, with the candidates
charting manifestly different paths for the nation and the polls showing a
tight race.2 The outcome of a gubernatorial recall vote in Wisconsin
promised to have a profound impact on the future of organized labor and
government finances throughout the country.3 A landmark Supreme Court
ruling on the constitutionality of federal health care reform legislation was
only weeks away.4 Meanwhile, a host of serious, intractable problems
continued to loom over the nation, from budget deficits and unemployment
to illegal immigration and climate change.
In the midst of these concerns, a new issue suddenly riveted the
nation’s attention. Americans discovered that the right to drink super-size
sodas had come under attack. Michael Bloomberg, Mayor of New York
City, proposed a ban on the sale of sugary drinks in containers larger than
sixteen fluid ounces.5 Bloomberg argued that the measure would benefit

† The William R. Jacques Constitutional Law Scholar and Professor of Law, University of
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1. See Gail MarksJarvis, Stock Market’s Next Act May Hinge on Greek Drama in June:
Elections Will Be Crucial to U.S., Global Economy, CHI. TRIB., May 30, 2012,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-30/business/ct-biz-0530-gail-20120530_1_painful-austerityfinancial-crisis-greeks-vote (explaining how the elections in Greece will impact the global economy).
2. See Richard W. Stevenson, Political Memo: Not the ’08 Campaign, but More May Be at
Stake,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
10,
2012,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ffullpag.html?res=
9B07EFDC1123F933A25755C0A9649D8B63 (describing the ideological divide between the
candidates).
3. See Thomas Fitzgerald, Wisconsin Recall Triggering National Issues, PHILA. INQUIRER,
June 6, 2012, http://articles.philly.com/2012-06-06/news/32056782_1_watchdog-group-middle-classmilwaukee-mayor-tom-barrett (discussing the attempted recall of Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker).
4. See Editorial, Historical Marker: Ruling on Obamacare Will Chart the Future of Our
Republic, AUGUSTA CHRON., June 2, 2012, http://chronicle.augusta.com/opinion/editorials/2012-0602/historical-marker (declaring that June 2012 is “the month history will be made” by a landmark
Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of the federal health care law).
5. Michael M. Grynbaum, New York Plans to Ban Sales of Big Sizes of Sugary Drinks, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/nyregion/bloomberg-plans-a-ban-on-largesugareddrinks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. The New York City Board of Health adopted Bloomberg’s
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public health in the city,6 where a majority of adults are obese or
overweight, as are forty percent of young children.7 Bloomberg emphasized
that his proposal would not actually impose a limit on anyone’s
consumption of any beverage. A person who wanted to guzzle a hefty
amount of sugar-laden soda could still do so, but would have to purchase it
in sixteen-ounce increments rather than in a single giant cup.8 The
Bloomberg proposal thus would serve principally as a way to send a
message to consumers. A person buying multiple smaller servings of soda,
rather than one immense container, might be more inclined to think about
and to moderate the amount consumed. Indeed, Bloomberg’s proposal was
an example of what Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein call “libertarian
paternalism,” the idea that governments should devise ways to “nudge”
people toward wise choices without denying anyone the ultimate individual
freedom to choose.9
The outcry against Bloomberg’s proposal was nevertheless intense.
Critics denounced Bloomberg as a “soda jerk,”10 a “big soda scrooge,”11
and the embodiment of a “Noodge Nation”12 or “Nanny Police state” run
amok.13 A full-page ad in the New York Times accused Bloomberg of being
“The Nanny,” depicting him with his head photoshopped onto a matronly
woman’s body.14 “You only thought you lived in the land of the free,” the
ad ominously warned.15 Supporters of Bloomberg’s proposal were equally
passionate, applauding the mayor for calling attention to the obesity
proposal in September 2012. See N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.53 (2012) (banning sale of sugary drinks in
containers larger than sixteen fluid ounces).
6. Grynbaum, supra note 5.
7. Tina Moore et al., New Yorkers Rip Bloomberg’s Proposed Ban on Big Sugary Sodas, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, May 31, 2012, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/thirsty-nyers-bloomy-article1.1087913.
8. Grynbaum, supra note 5. Bloomberg’s proposal also would apply only to sales of
beverages at locations regulated by the city’s health department, such as restaurants, movie theaters,
sports stadiums, and sidewalk food carts. It would not affect sales at grocery or convenience stores. Id.
9. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4–5 (2009).
10. Tina Moore & Oren Yaniv, Soda Jerk: Thirsty Critics Pan Mike’s New ‘Nanny’ Plan, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, May 31, 2012, at 2.
11. Id.
12. Ruth Marcus, The Rise of Noodge Government, WASH. POST, June 5, 2012,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-05/opinions/35462459_1_sugary-drinks-food-allergiessuper-size.
13. Editorial, New Soda Wars: Infringement on Freedoms?, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, June 6, 2012,
http://articles.philly.com/2012-06-06/news/32056729_1_nanny-state-soda-tax-sugary-drinks.
14. Press Release, Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, Full-Page Advertisement in The New York
Times Condemns “Nanny” Bloomberg’s Latest Attack on Personal Responsibility (June 1, 2012) (on
file with author).
15. Id.
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epidemic and the adverse effects of excessive sugar consumption.16 A day
before the new law was set to take effect, a judge struck it down as
“arbitrary and capricious,” concluding that Bloomberg had improperly
infringed on legislative authority by implementing his proposal as a Board
of Health regulation rather than having it enacted by the City Council.17
Bloomberg vowed that he would prevail on appeal.18
The furor surrounding Bloomberg’s proposal reflected a larger conflict
of values and beliefs about the role of governments. The soda controversy
arose in the midst of “a broader public anxiety about overbearing
government,” fueled by “[t]he bank and auto bailouts, the massive stimulus
package, and sweeping new regulations of health care and the financial
industry.”19 A large portion of Americans feel that government has
overstepped its bounds. Yet, an equally ardent bloc looks at the array of
dilemmas facing the nation and demands that government should be doing
more to solve problems, not less.
This debate about the perils and potential benefits of governmental
intervention is reverberating in legal arenas as well as in the broader realm
of politics and society. In particular, a recent wave of litigation about the
commercial speech rights of product manufacturers provides a prime
example of this tension. Pharmaceutical manufacturers have questioned
laws that limit what they can tell doctors about using drugs in ways federal
regulators have not yet approved.20 Tobacco companies have challenged the
federal government’s push to dramatically expand the warnings on cigarette
packages.21 Cell phone providers claim that San Francisco has infringed
First Amendment rights by requiring them to provide notice to customers
about radiation emitted by wireless devices.22 The food industry has entered
the fray as well, asserting that freedom of speech should protect restaurants
from being forced to disclose the calorie content of items on their menus.23
16. See, e.g., Mike Lupica, Mayor Bloomberg Deserves Credit for Trying to Do the Right
Thing by Banning Big Sugary Drinks, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 1, 2012, http://www.nydailynews.com/
new-york/mayor-bloomberg-deserves-credit-banning-big-sugary-drinks-article-1.1087905
(defending
the soda ban as a necessary first step in fighting the obesity epidemic in New York City).
17. N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, slip op. at 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013); see Michael M.
Grynbaum, Judge Blocks New York City’s Limits on Big Sugary Drinks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/nyregion/judge-invalidates-bloombergs-sodaban.html?pagewanted=all&_r=o (discussing court’s recent decision to strike soda ban)..
18. Grynbaum, supra note 17.
19. Marcus, supra note 12.
20. See infra Part II-A.
21. See infra Part II-B.
22. See infra Part II-C.
23. See infra Part II-D.
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This Article looks at the intriguing battles that have been and continue
to be fought over commercial speech rights. It explores the evolution of
commercial speech’s treatment under the First Amendment and how new
cases now underway might affect the future of commercial speech
regulation. For several decades, commercial speech has floated somewhere
in the middle of the free speech spectrum, receiving an intermediate level of
protection.24 Two basic competing themes have emerged in the Supreme
Court’s commercial speech decisions. Some members of the Court have
suggested that the government should have little power to regulate
commercial speech beyond a narrow interest in preventing deception or
fraud.25 If a commercial message is not false or misleading, the government
must let people hear it and decide for themselves whether they find it
persuasive. That view, currently championed by Clarence Thomas, sees
impermissible paternalism in any suggestion that the public could be better
off acquiring less knowledge from commercial marketing efforts.26
The rival viewpoint, once advanced primarily by William Rehnquist
and now by Stephen Breyer, emphasizes judicial deference to reasonable
legislative determinations about the best way to balance the interests of
commercial speakers and the public.27 Preventing consumer deception is not
the government’s only legitimate concern, and courts should approach
commercial speech issues with a pragmatic eye toward all of the interests at
stake rather than a rigidly anti-paternalistic dogma.28
The Supreme Court’s decisions have wavered between these two
perspectives, with neither achieving complete dominance. Both views show
up in lower court opinions on commercial speech issues as well.29 Despite
the tension between these two paradigms, judges need not make a
categorical choice between them. Constitutional analysis of commercial
speech issues can strike a balance between the two. Freedom of speech is
undoubtedly a vital, cherished ideal, and commercial speech can serve
important interests by bringing useful information to the public as well as
promoting businesses and their productive economic activities. Courts
should be wary of laws that assume society would be better off with less
information exchanged. At the same time, governments must be able to
respond to matters of genuine public concern. Paternalism has acquired a
bad name, and surely even the most well-meaning government efforts can
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See infra Parts I-B, I-C.
See infra Part I-C.
See infra Part I-E.
See infra Part III.
See infra Parts I-D, I-F.
See infra Part IV.
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be taken too far, but governments should not entirely foreswear efforts to
encourage people toward making better choices. Rather than allowing
doctrinaire abstractions to drive their decisions, judges should strive to be
relentlessly realistic about what is at stake on each side of these cases.
This Article thus steers a middle course through the scholarly literature
on the commercial speech doctrine, most of which has taken one of two
extreme positions. Some have argued that commercial speech should
receive no constitutional protection at all,30 while others have argued that it
should receive the full protection accorded to the most valued types of
political, artistic, or other expression.31 Eschewing those extremes, this
Article urges courts to maintain an intermediate level of constitutional
protection for commercial expression and preserve the flexibility needed to
reach decisions that best accommodate the overall interests of businesses
and consumers.
Part I of this Article begins by looking at the development of
constitutional protection for commercial speech, focusing on key decisions
made by the U.S. Supreme Court. This Part describes the origins of
commercial speech doctrine and lays out the basic tests that the Court has
used to evaluate the constitutionality of laws that restrict commercial speech
or that require businesses to disclose more information about their products
or services. This Part of the Article also traces the emergence of two
fundamental themes in the Supreme Court’s commercial speech
jurisprudence: (1) a pragmatic inclination to defer to reasonable legislative
judgments, and (2) an anti-paternalistic impulse that condemns
governments for acting on fears that truthful information will encourage
people to make bad choices. Part II focuses on recent controversies about
commercial speech that have worked their way to or through the lower
courts. Pharmaceutical companies’ speech about off-label uses of drugs
provides an example of how government regulators can strive to achieve a
fair balance between commercial speech and public health interests. New
federal laws regarding tobacco have raised novel questions about the
30. Se e, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1, 9, 13 (1976); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry
into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 355 (1978); Vincent Blasi, The
Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 484–89 (1985); Thomas H.
Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 14–40 (1979).
31. See
, e.g., Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, The Chickens Have Come Home to Roost:
Individualism, Collectivism and Conflict in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 9 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 237,
269–71 (2004); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV.
627, 628 (1990); Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for
Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780, 791–93 (1993).
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expressive significance of visual images in advertising and on product
packaging and government-mandated warning labels. A San Francisco
ordinance concerning cell phones has forced judges to confront the difficult
issue of what to do when a government wants businesses to warn
consumers about a danger that might exist but probably does not. And
finally, laws requiring restaurants to post calorie counts on their menus
acutely raise the fundamental question of where to draw the line on
paternalistic efforts to promote public health. Pragmatism about
government efforts to solve problems and wariness about overreaching
paternalism are not mutually exclusive concerns, but instead can coexist
within soundly balanced First Amendment doctrine on commercial speech
rights.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S WINDING ROAD

Commercial speech has been one of the most controversial and
unsettled areas of constitutional law in recent years. It is “frequently
considered an area in need of reform, and possibly even of demolition.”32
The Supreme Court’s decisions have been “unsteady and somewhat
unpredictable.”33 Those decisions nevertheless provide a basic framework
and starting point for the analysis of commercial speech issues. Moreover,
looking back at the major opinions underscores important features of the
Court’s reasoning and significant ways in which the debate over
commercial speech has shifted. As commercial speech doctrine evolved
over the years, so did the ideological orientations of its supporters and
opponents. The Supreme Court’s liberal lions led the charge for commercial
speech in the 1970s and 1980s, but gradually the tables turned and the
Court’s conservative members became some of the most ardent advocates
for commercial speech rights.
A. The Origins of Commercial Speech Rights
Constitutional protection for commercial speech got off to a very slow
start. In its 1942 decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Supreme Court
unanimously found it quite obvious that “purely commercial advertising”
was beyond the scope of the First Amendment’s protection.34 The opinion
32. Charles Fischette, A New Architecture of Commercial Speech Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 663, 663 (2008).
33. Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1, 32 (2007).
34. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). The Bill of Rights applies directly to the
federal government only, but freedom of speech and all other rights protected by the First Amendment
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was brief and the analysis was remarkably scant. One of the Justices who
joined in making the decision, William O. Douglas, later described the
ruling as “casual, almost offhand.”35 But the decision nevertheless reflected
a sensible, pragmatic perspective. In making this decision, the Court did not
indulge in abstract theorizing or subtle arguments about the constitutional
text or history. Rather, the Court based its decision entirely on a policy
judgment that courts should defer to legislative determinations about how
best to regulate business activities and balance the interests of commercial
enterprises and the public.36 While recognizing that in some instances a
commercial message might be intertwined with other types of expression,
the Court stressed that businesses should not be able to invoke the First
Amendment’s protection through the subterfuge of inserting some “civil
appeal” or “moral platitude” into their advertising.37
Over the next several decades, the Court gradually backed away from
the stark pronouncement of Valentine v. Chrestensen and began to bring
commercial speech within the First Amendment’s reach. But the Court
principally did so in cases involving advertisements quite different than a
typical business promotion. For example, the Court’s seminal decision
about First Amendment limits on libel actions, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, concerned a newspaper advertisement.38 The ad, however, was not
placed by a business to promote a conventional product or service. Instead,
the ad editorialized about conflicts between civil rights protestors and law
enforcement authorities in the South.39 Additionally, it solicited donations
to support the protest movement and to pay for Martin Luther King, Jr.’s
legal defense against a perjury charge.40 The Court concluded that the ad
presented information and argument about matters of great public concern
and was clearly “not a ‘commercial’ advertisement in the sense in which the
word was used in Chrestensen.”41
The Court further opened the door to constitutional protection for
commercial speech in Bigelow v. Virginia,42 a case that concerned a
Virginia newspaper editor convicted for publishing an advertisement about
have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment so that they apply with equal force to state and
local government actions. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034–35 (2010). For the sake
of brevity, I will simply use the term “First Amendment” in this Article even when technically a First
Amendment right incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment is actually at issue.
35. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
36. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54–55.
37. Id. at 55.
38. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 254 (1964).
39. Id. at 256–57.
40. Id. at 257.
41. Id. at 266.
42. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).

534

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 37:527

abortion services available in New York.43 The Bigelow case arrived at the
Court two years after Roe v. Wade.44 Although the Court insisted that
Bigelow was a First Amendment case, and not an abortion case, the Bigelow
ruling was essentially an addendum to Roe’s conclusion that women have a
constitutional right to have an abortion in some circumstances.45 The same
nine men decided both cases, and they split 7-2 in Bigelow just as they had
in Roe, with Harry Blackmun writing the majority opinion in both
instances.46
Commercial speech thus did not make its way unescorted into the arena
of constitutional protection. It instead arrived there via cases involving
advertisements implicating other significant constitutional interests. The
civil rights movement and abortion were obviously major topics of national
controversy, and concerns about promoting racial equality and access to
abortion services raised the constitutional stakes well above those
surrounding routine business promotions. As the Court put it, the cases
implicated “the constitutional interests of the general public,” not just the
rights of a business hoping to promote itself or a newspaper hoping to profit
by running the ads.47
Liberal justices eagerly embraced the idea of extending First
Amendment protection to commercial speech. Again, it surely did not hurt
that commercial speech issues reached the Court intertwined with other
rights that liberals would be most likely to favor and interpret expansively.
But the liberal justices’ enthusiasm for protecting commercial speech was
also a natural offshoot of their highly libertarian perspective on other
freedom of speech issues.48 The Court’s liberal members in that era
“evinced an increasing hostility to the exclusion of specific categories of
speech from First Amendment protections,” and therefore they resisted the
notion that commercial speech stood entirely outside the Constitution’s
reach.49

43. Id. at 811–12.
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 815 n.5.
46. The Court would later extend Bigelow to protect commercial speech concerning
contraceptives. See Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61 (1983) (striking down ban on
unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S.
678, 681–82 (1977) (striking down ban on advertisement or display of contraceptives).
47. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822; see also Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478
U.S. 328, 345–46 (1986) (noting that the constitutional right to abortion was a crucial ingredient in
Bigelow).
48. See Eric M. Maltz, The Strange Career of Commercial Speech, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 161, 162–
63 (2003) (discussing the libertarian views of the Court during the Warren era).
49. Id.
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Liberal justices also favored protecting commercial speech as a means
of advancing the interests of consumers. Their opinions emphasized the
consumers’ perspective rather than that of businesses. For example, in
striking down restraints on pharmacy advertising of prescription drug
prices, the Court noted that drug prices varied dramatically from store to
store, but that the advertising restriction prevented consumers from
knowing where to find the lowest prices.50 While enlarging the speech
rights of pharmacies, the Court did so in a way likely to result in an overall
net financial gain for consumers through increased competition, lower
pharmacy prices, and lower profit margins. Likewise, the Court’s decisions
about attorney advertising reflected a liberal desire to expand access to legal
services, particularly in situations involving left-leaning causes like
protecting reproductive rights.51 Thurgood Marshall, for example, suggested
that the central objective was not to help lawyers but instead to ensure that
bar disciplinary rules “not be utilized to obstruct the distribution of legal
services to all those in need of them.”52
The Supreme Court thus emphasized that commercial speech receives
constitutional protection for the sake of the speech’s potential audience, not
just to satisfy the individualistic interests of the speaker.53 A consumer’s
interest in “the free flow of commercial information” may be even stronger
“than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”54 The public has
a corresponding interest in ensuring that consumers have information with
which to form intelligent opinions and make wise choices.55 From the
beginning, these practical considerations about promoting the public’s best
interests were a crucial part of the Court’s rationale for extending
constitutional protection to commercial speech.
The Supreme Court’s most conservative member at that time, William
Rehnquist, stubbornly and vociferously dissented from each step of the

50. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 754 &
n.11 (1976).
51. Compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449, 454 (1978) (upholding
prohibition on in-person solicitation of clients by personal injury lawyer), with In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 422 (1978) (invalidating punishment for in-person solicitation where attorney was affiliated with
American Civil Liberties Union and potential clients were women sterilized or threatened with
sterilization as a condition for receiving Medicaid assistance).
52. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468–69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgments).
53. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756–57 (recognizing the existence of a “right to
receive the advertising” as well as a “right to advertise”).
54. Id. at 763.
55. Id. at 765.
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Court’s march toward First Amendment rights for commercial speech.56 In
Rehnquist’s view, the First Amendment right to freedom of speech should
remain “a sanctuary for expressions of public importance or intellectual
interest,”57 and the Court demeaned the right by “elevat[ing] commercial
intercourse between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike
a bargain to the same plane as has been previously reserved for the free
marketplace of ideas.”58
A lonely voice for judicial restraint on the issue, Rehnquist argued that
courts could safely defer to legislative determinations about society’s best
interests.59 An unimpeded flow of commercial information from businesses
to consumers could be harmful or beneficial, and it should be the
legislature’s job to decide how to factor those considerations into the
process of making laws.60 Virginia consumers might benefit from more
information about drug prices, for example, but surely that “should
presumptively be the concern of the Virginia Legislature, which sits to
balance these and other claims in the process of making laws.”61 And if
elected officials reached a different conclusion than the Court about what
policy would best serve the public’s interests, Rehnquist found “nothing in
the United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to
hew to the teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions.”62
Rehnquist warned that the Supreme Court’s decisions would soon lead
down a slippery slope.63 Unless judges bestowed on themselves the
undeserved task of selecting what sorts of commercial messages deserved
special favor, constitutional armor would shield every commercial
proposition. Without courts discriminating on the basis of advertising’s
content, why would a promotion of abortion services deserve more
protection than “an advertisement for a bucket shop operation or a Ponzi
scheme”?64 If a pharmacy has a constitutional right to run an ad touting its
low prices for prescription drugs, why not an ad urging patients to ask their
doctors to prescribe opiates for minor pain relief?65 “Pain getting you
down? Insist that your physician prescribe Demerol.”66 Indeed, once the
56. For a discussion of Rehnquist’s commercial speech jurisprudence, see Maltz, supra note
48, at 167–69.
57. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 404 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 781–84.
60. Id. at 783.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 784.
63. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 405 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 831 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 788 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
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constitutional door was open, judges would be unable to exclude
promotions of products like tobacco, alcohol, and “other products the use of
which it has previously been thought desirable to discourage.”67 Any hope
of establishing “understandable and workable differentiations between
protected and unprotected speech in the field of advertising” would soon
disappear.68
B. The Central Hudson Test for Restrictions on Commercial Speech
Once the Supreme Court decided to bring commercial speech within
the First Amendment’s reach, the obvious next question was what analysis
or tests would be used to determine the validity of the wide range of
government actions that could infringe on commercial speech. In Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,
the Court laid out a framework to analyze commercial speech restrictions.69
First, the Court declared that speech that is deceptive or promotes illegal
activities falls entirely outside the scope of the First Amendment.70
Government bans on those types of expression, therefore, do not infringe
the right to freedom of speech.71 But if commercial speech is not misleading
or related to illegal activity, the government can restrict it only if: (1) the
government has a substantial interest that will be served by the restriction,
(2) the restriction directly advances that government interest, and (3) the
restriction is not more extensive than is necessary to serve the government’s
interest.72
The Central Hudson test essentially imposed an intermediate level of
scrutiny on commercial speech restrictions. The Court has emphasized that
this is a “lesser” level of protection than that afforded to other types of
speech.73 For example, while the First Amendment generally prohibits
content-based censorship of speech, the Court did not insist that restrictions
on commercial speech must be content-neutral.74 Businesses have financial
incentives that make commercial speech a “hardy breed of expression”
unlikely to be chilled by government regulation.75
67. Id. at 781.
68. Bates, 433 U.S. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
70. Id. at 563–64.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 566. In subsequent cases, the Court tweaked the third prong of the test, concluding
that the government is not required to employ the least restrictive of all conceivable means of achieving
its objective. See infra notes 110–115 and accompanying text.
73. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63.
74. Id. at 564 n.6.
75. Id.
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While the Court settled on an intermediate scrutiny analysis for
restrictions on commercial speech in Central Hudson, the Court’s liberal
wing wanted to go further and subject at least some types of commercial
speech restraints to even more demanding scrutiny.76 They urged that only a
“clear and present danger” could justify government restrictions aimed at
suppressing truthful information about a legal product.77
At the conservative end of the Court’s ideological spectrum, William
Rehnquist remained appalled by the Court’s exaggeration of the
constitutional significance of commercial speech. In Central Hudson, he
was the only member of the Court who thought it was reasonable for the
state of New York to promote energy conservation by prohibiting electric
utilities from advertising.78 While the other justices offered only a vague
acknowledgement that saving energy was an important objective,79
Rehnquist emphasized that the state had issued the challenged policy in
1973, at the height of the national energy crisis precipitated by Arab
countries’ embargo of oil exports to the United States.80 Although the
advertising ban remained in effect after the embargo’s end, Rehnquist
recognized that the episode had unequivocally established the “paramount
national interest” in energy conservation.81 Indeed, the Supreme Court
rendered its decision in Central Hudson in the middle of 1980, a time when
energy prices had surged dramatically because of the oil crisis brought on
by Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979.82
Rehnquist thus emphasized the practical consequences of the Court’s
decision while the rest of the Court focused on abstract ideals. Rehnquist
criticized the majority for its skepticism about the extent to which a ban on
electric utility advertising would really serve the government’s asserted
76. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 351 (1986)
(Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (“Where the government seeks to suppress the
dissemination of nonmisleading commercial speech relating to legal activities, for fear that recipients
will act on the information provided, such regulation should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.”).
77. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574–75 (Blackmun and Brennan, JJ., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 581 (Stevens and Brennan, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
78. Id. at 583–84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 568 (majority opinion) (“In view of our country’s dependence on energy
resources beyond our control, no one can doubt the importance of energy conservation.”).
80. Id. at 583 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. See Jad Mouawad, Gas Prices Soar, Posing a Threat to Family Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/27/business/27gas.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print (noting
that oil prices reached an inflation-adjusted all-time high in April 1980). In a newspaper article
published just a few days after the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Hudson, a utility company
analyst lamented that “[i]t’s very hard for people to realize that the days of energy availability and lower
prices are gone forever.” Phil McCombs, Rising Electricity Prices: Real Impetus to Conserve, WASH.
POST, June 24, 1980, at B1.
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goal of energy conservation. “Until I have mastered electrical engineering
and marketing,” Rehnquist declared, “I am not prepared to contradict by
virtue of my judicial office those who assume that the ban will be
successful in making a substantial contribution to conservation efforts.”83
According to Rehnquist, the Court’s commercial speech decisions
threatened to drag the country back to the discredited doctrines of the
Lochner era, when “it was common practice for this Court to strike down
economic regulations adopted by a State based on the Court’s own notions
of the most appropriate means for the State to implement its considered
policies.”84 The Court, in Rehnquist’s view, had unwisely “unlocked a
Pandora’s Box.”85
C. The Zauderer Test for Compelled Commercial Speech
While most of the Supreme Court’s commercial speech cases have
dealt with government attempts to censor or restrict expression, the Court
has also faced situations where a government sought to require a
commercial speaker to communicate a particular message. In other words,
some cases lie at the intersection of the First Amendment doctrines of
commercial speech and compelled speech.
As soon as it began to bring commercial speech within the First
Amendment’s protection, the Supreme Court emphasized the distinction
between speech restrictions and speech requirements.86 In some other
contexts, the notion of government-compelled speech is as abhorrent as any
restrictive censorship law. For example, the Supreme Court has held that
children cannot be forced to recite a pledge that is contrary to the religious
beliefs of the children and their parents.87 Even when patriotic feelings are
at a peak or partisan disputes are at their most intense, there is no clamor for
the Supreme Court to overrule that decision. Forcing people to speak in
defiance of their most fundamental personal beliefs violates autonomy and
freedom of conscience in an unmistakable and unsupportable way. But
there is nothing as repulsive about the government inserting additional
messages into businesses’ commercial appeals. Business transactions and
83.
84.
85.
86.

Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 589 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
Id. at 598.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650–651

(1985).
87. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.”).
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advertising are typically not the most deeply personal part of one’s life and
being. Recognizing this clear difference in the degree of intrusion involved,
the Court explicitly noted, in early cases in the evolution of commercial
speech doctrine, that the Constitution would not prevent governments from
requiring “that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include
such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to
prevent its being deceptive.”88
When a compelled commercial speech case finally came before the
Court, the justices concluded that the Central Hudson analysis is not the
appropriate way to analyze situations in which the government compels
commercial speech rather than restricts it.89 Requiring speech is
fundamentally different from prohibiting it. Compelled speech expands
communication, albeit in a way that the speaker does not prefer. When the
government mandates the insertion of a new message into advertisements,
for example, the government has not stopped the advertisers from saying
whatever they want to say. Instead, “[I]t has only required them to provide
somewhat more information than they might otherwise be inclined to
present.”90
The Supreme Court’s leading case on compelled commercial speech is
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
which concerned an Ohio attorney’s advertisements offering to represent
clients in certain product liability cases on a contingent fee basis.91 The ad
stated that “[i]f there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed by our
clients.”92 The state bar authorities reprimanded the attorney because the ad
did not explain that a client who brought an unsuccessful claim could be
liable for legal costs, even if the attorney charged no fees in such a
situation.93 The ad was deceptive, according to the bar authorities, because
potential clients might not realize their potential liability for costs unless the
advertisement explained the distinction between costs and fees.94
The Supreme Court ruled against the advertising attorney in Zauderer
on this point, upholding the disclosure demanded by the state bar’s
disciplinary officials.95 The Court held that “an advertiser’s rights are
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably
88.
n.24 (1976).
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 &
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.
Id.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634–635.
Id. at 635.
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related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”96 This
test would ensure, the Court suggested, that governments would have
adequate ability to protect consumers while precluding truly “unjustified or
unduly burdensome disclosure requirements.”97
Zauderer thus provided a legal test for situations in which the
government seeks to compel the addition of uncontroversial facts to
advertisements that would otherwise be deceptive. But beyond that,
uncertainties remained. To what extent can the government require the
inclusion of a message that does not consist merely of uncontroversial
facts?98 And to what extent can the government compel the addition of
speech to a commercial message that is not false or misleading?99 Zauderer
did not explicitly provide answers to those questions.
D. Greater Deference to Legislatures
With the Central Hudson test governing commercial speech
restrictions and Zauderer providing a standard for evaluating at least some
varieties of compelled commercial speech, the Supreme Court had a basic
framework in place for itself and lower courts to follow. Several decades of
adjudication under that framework, however, produced uneven results and
proved that the constitutional controversy over commercial speech was far
from over.
William Rehnquist, the Supreme Court’s foremost critic of commercial
speech rights, realized that the Court was not going to reverse itself and
exclude commercial speech from the First Amendment’s reach. He
grudgingly accepted the rules established by the Court’s commercial speech
precedents and began focusing his arguments on how those tests should be
96. Id. at 651.
97. Id. The Court’s two most liberal members, William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall,
argued that the test established by the majority opinion would make it too easy for governments to
compel commercial speech. See id. at 657–64 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the Central Hudson test should apply to compelled commercial speech
as well as commercial speech restrictions).
98. For discussion of how this question should be answered, see infra notes 336-343 and
accompanying text.
99. Lower courts generally have read Zauderer broadly to cover disclosures intended to better
inform consumers, not just those intended to prevent consumer deception. See N.Y. State Restaurant
Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v.
Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that Zauderer is not limited to situations where the
government seeks to cure what would otherwise be deceptive advertising); Pharm. Care Mgt. Ass’n v.
Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting the argument that Zauderer applies only to
potentially deceptive advertising and explaining that “we have found no cases limiting Zauderer in such
a way”). But see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213–14 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding
that Zauderer applies only to disclosure requirements that correct misleading commercial speech).
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applied, rather than arguing that the past cases were wrong and should be
overruled.100
In doing so, Rehnquist soon began to find some success in influencing
the outcome of commercial speech cases. He finally had the chance to write
a majority opinion concerning commercial speech in 1986, when the Court
upheld a restriction on casino advertising in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.101 The case concerned a law that
prohibited casinos in Puerto Rico from engaging in any gambling
advertising aimed at the people of Puerto Rico.102 In other words, the
casinos could advertise only in ways that would lure tourists to the island to
gamble rather than encourage local residents to gamble.
Writing for a 5-4 majority, the central thrust of Rehnquist’s analysis
was judicial deference to legislators.103 Puerto Rico’s elected
representatives enacted the law, they presumably had good reasons for
doing so, and courts need not override that judgment.104
Rehnquist added an important assertion about the potential illogic of
overzealously protecting commercial speech rights. The casino operator that
brought the Posadas case argued that, having chosen to legalize casino
gambling, the Puerto Rico legislature should not then be allowed to turn
around and put restrictions on advertising in order to discourage people
from patronizing the casinos.105 Rehnquist concluded that the casino
operator “has the argument backwards.”106 If a legislature has the power to
prohibit a good or service altogether, it surely has the power “to take the
less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand
through restrictions on advertising.”107 Rehnquist added that it would be a
“Pyrrhic victory” for casinos if they won the right to advertise freely but
thereby drove the Puerto Rico legislature to prohibit casino gambling by
local residents.108 Likewise, it would be a “strange constitutional doctrine”
that gave legislatures the power to pull a product off the market but not the
100. For example, Rehnquist did not dissent when the Court found advertising restrictions
unconstitutional in In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 192, 205 (1982) (striking down restrictions on attorney
advertising), or Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61 (1983) (striking down ban on
unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements).
101. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 330–31 (1986).
102. Id. at 332–33.
103. Id. at 341–42.
104. See id. at 352 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (complaining that Rehnquist’s opinion “does little
more than defer to what it perceives to be the determination by Puerto Rico’s Legislature that a ban on
casino advertising aimed at residents is reasonable”).
105. Id. at 346.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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lesser power to prohibit or regulate advertising for it.109 If taken to its
logical conclusion, Rehnquist’s greater-includes-lesser reasoning would
reach far beyond cases about gambling and justify sweeping censorship or
prohibition of advertising for all sorts of other goods and services.
Rehnquist gained a deeply conservative ally when Antonin Scalia took
a seat on the Court, and it initially appeared that Scalia would join
Rehnquist in pushing back against the expansion of commercial speech
rights. Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox,110 which considered whether a state
university could prohibit product demonstrations, such as “Tupperware
parties,” in dormitory rooms. Over the dissent of its three most liberal
members, the Court tweaked the third prong of the Central Hudson test.111
That prong of the test, requiring the government’s action to be “not more
extensive than is necessary” to serve the government’s interest,112 had been
understood to mean that the government must employ the least restrictive
means of achieving its objective.113 In other words, the government could
not justify censorship of commercial expression if it had some other
conceivable way to achieve its goal. But in Board of Trustees v. Fox, the
Court disavowed that demanding rule in favor of a softer standard requiring
the government merely to show that its chosen course of action was
narrowly tailored to achieve its goal, so that the restriction imposed on
speech was not significantly more extensive than necessary.114 This requires
only a “reasonable” fit between the government’s action and its objective,
not a perfect correspondence.115
Board of Trustees v. Fox thus moved the law in Rehnquist’s direction,
even if it was a limited step. The opinion echoed Rehnquist’s past
arguments about the need for judicial deference to legislative
determinations, explaining that its holding would give governments
“needed leeway” to regulate commercial speech.116 It appeared that the
Court, growing more conservative thanks to appointments made by
President Reagan and his successor George H.W. Bush, might be ready to
follow Rehnquist’s lead toward curtailing First Amendment protection for
commercial speech even further.
109. Id.
110. Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
111. Id. at 486 (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
112. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
113. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 476 (noting that the Court has employed a “least-restrictive” means
approach in commercial speech cases).
114. Id. at 480.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 481.
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E. The Push Against Paternalism
Rehnquist’s hopes were dashed, as a conservative coalition that would
significantly curb commercial speech rights never emerged. The Court
splintered in several directions on commercial speech issues, but rather than
simply dividing along the customary liberal-conservative ideological
dimension, the principal fault line was attitudes toward governmental
paternalism. Through a series of cases spread across two decades, the
Justices have carried on a vigorous debate about the extent to which the
government should ever be permitted to suppress advertisers’ dissemination
of true information on the ground that the public would be better off not
hearing it.
Some of the more liberal members of the Court had long denounced
the “highly paternalistic” idea that the government should ever strive to
keep people uninformed for their own good.117 It is always better, they
argued, to assume that “information is not in itself harmful, that people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and
that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication
rather than to close them.”118 Harry Blackmun, in particular, tirelessly
argued that truthful commercial speech should receive greater protection
than the intermediate scrutiny afforded by the Central Hudson test.119
The anti-paternalist perspective gained stalwart support from the
conservative side of the Court when Clarence Thomas became a staunch
advocate for commercial speech rights.120 In his first few years on the
Court, Thomas seemed to share Rehnquist’s highly deferential attitude

117. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
118. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
119. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777–78 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(disagreeing with the majority’s analysis that commercial speech “that is free from fraud or duress or the
advocacy of unlawful activity is entitled to only an ‘intermediate standard’” of scrutiny); City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 431–38 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating
that the Central Hudson analysis provides insufficient protection for truthful, noncoercive commercial
speech concerning lawful activities); see also United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 439
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (denouncing restriction on lottery advertising as “extremely
paternalistic” measure that could be justified only “by a truly substantial governmental interest”).
120. For analysis of Thomas’s position on commercial speech, see Jennifer R. Franklin,
Peaches, Speech, and Clarence Thomas: Yes, California, There Is a Justice Who Understands the
Ramifications of Controlling Commercial Speech, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 627, 638 (2000); David L.
Hudson, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas: The Emergence of a Commercial-Speech Protector, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 485, 487 (2002); Steven B. Lichtman, Black Like Me: The Free Speech
Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 415, 426–29 (2009).
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toward commercial speech restrictions.121 But Thomas soon shifted
direction. The first major hint of this came in Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co.,122 where Thomas led the Court in rejecting the notion that the
government should have extra leeway to regulate commercial speech
concerning “socially harmful” vices like gambling or alcohol.123
A year later, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court
unanimously struck down a state ban on alcohol price advertising.124 The
pendulum had swung a long way from where it had been a decade earlier,
when the Court upheld the restriction on Puerto Rico casino gambling in
Posadas.125 Even Rehnquist now conceded that his opinion for the majority
in Posadas had gone too far in its deference to legislative determinations.126
Courts needed to carefully examine legislative assertions about the need for
commercial speech restrictions rather than accepting them at face value.127
Clarence Thomas went further in his concurring opinion in 44
Liquormart, staking a claim as the foremost proponent of commercial
speech rights in the Court’s history. Thomas challenged the notion that
commercial speech should receive only an intermediate level of
constitutional scrutiny, finding no “philosophical or historical basis” for the
idea that commercial speech is of less value than the sorts of speech
receiving full constitutional protection.128 Moreover, Thomas emphatically
denounced the idea that a government restriction of commercial speech
could ever be justified on the ground that it would benefit society “to keep
legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their
choices in the marketplace.”129 That sort of paternalistic government
interest, Thomas argued, should be “per se illegitimate.”130
The Court came tantalizingly close to embracing Thomas’s view in 44
Liquormart. Three other members of the Court (John Paul Stevens,
Anthony Kennedy, and Ruth Ginsburg) similarly concluded that judges
121. For example, Thomas joined Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 438–46, urging that a city’s ban on commercial news racks should be
upheld.
122. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995) (striking down federal law
prohibiting beer labels displaying alcohol content).
123. Id. at 482 n.2.
124. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J. concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
125. See supra notes 101–109 and accompanying text.
126. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 531–32 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined
by Rehnquist, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 518.
130. Id.; see also id. at 526 (“[A]ll attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping
them ignorant are impermissible.”).
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should be “especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the
dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”131 Justice
Scalia sympathized with that view, but declined to provide a fifth vote for
dramatically revamping the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence until
he had a chance to gain better insight into eighteenth and nineteenth century
legislative practices and understandings about government authority to
regulate commercial speech.132 The Central Hudson test thus survived, but
barely so, and its days seemed numbered.
Defying expectations, Central Hudson proved to be oddly resilient. In
case after case, the Supreme Court acknowledged the controversy
surrounding the Central Hudson standard, noting that many judges and
scholars had called for intensifying the scrutiny of commercial speech
restrictions, but nevertheless concluded that there was no immediate need
for the Court to reconsider Central Hudson and break new ground.133 Only
Clarence Thomas seemed ready and willing to take the plunge and disavow
Central Hudson once and for all.134 Thomas eventually set his sights on
overruling Zauderer as well. He expressed skepticism about Zauderer’s
basic premise that the government deserves more leeway when compelling
commercial speech than when restricting it.135 In his view, the government
should bear an equally strict burden when telling a commercial advertiser
what to say as when telling it what not to say.136
While the Court never overruled Central Hudson or Zauderer, or
expressly replaced their tests with more demanding requirements, it
sometimes applied the tests in ways that inched toward giving more
exacting scrutiny to commercial speech restraints. For example, in

131. The relevant portion of Justice Stevens’ opinion, id. at 503, was joined only by Justices
Kennedy and Ginsburg.
132. Id. at 517–18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
133. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (declining to reconsider
Central Hudson because Vermont restriction on use of pharmacy data was invalid even under Central
Hudson); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367–68 (2002) (declining to reconsider
Central Hudson because federal restriction on pharmacy advertising of compounded drugs was invalid
even under Central Hudson); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001) (declining
to reconsider Central Hudson because Massachusetts limits on tobacco advertising were invalid even
under Central Hudson); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)
(declining to reconsider Central Hudson because federal ban on broadcast ads for casinos was invalid
even under Central Hudson).
134. See, e.g., Thompson, 535 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572
(Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Greater New Orleans Broad., 527 U.S. at
197 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 (2010) (Thomas
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
136. Id.
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Edenfield v. Fane,137 the Court described the Central Hudson test as placing
a burden on the government that “is not satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture.”138 The government instead “must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real” and that restraining commercial speech “will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree.”139 That formulation put sharp teeth in
the Central Hudson test and went a significant step toward Justice
Thomas’s desire to elevate the scrutiny of commercial speech restrictions.
F. The Pragmatic Perspective
Meanwhile, other members of the Court continued to debate whether
paternalism might ever be an adequate justification for government
restrictions on commercial speech. If censoring certain commercial
messages would yield tremendous benefits for public health, for example,
should judges interpret the First Amendment in ways that will permit such
censorship to occur?
Restrictions on the advertising of tobacco, a product with an unusually
severe and unequivocally detrimental impact on Americans’ health,
squarely raised that dilemma. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Court
examined Massachusetts regulations that banned outdoor advertising of
tobacco products within one thousand feet of a school or playground, and
required indoor ads to be at least five feet off the ground to reduce their
visibility to young children.140 The majority struck down the regulations,
concluding that no matter how harmful tobacco may be, it is a legal product
for adult use, and therefore “the tobacco industry has a protected interest in
communicating information about its products and adult customers have an
interest in receiving that information.”141

137. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763 (1993) (striking down a Florida statute prohibiting inperson solicitation of clients by certified public accountants).
138. Id. at 770.
139. Id. at 771. But cf. Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628–29 (1995) (noting that
while Edenfield requires a “concrete, nonspeculative” showing of harm, it does not necessarily require
detailed empirical proof).
140. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 535 (2001). The Court held that federal law
preempted the advertising restrictions as to cigarettes, and so the Court’s analysis of the First
Amendment issues pertained only to the limits on cigar and smokeless tobacco advertising. Id. at 553
(Thomas, J., concurring).
141. Id . at 571. The majority included the three members of the Court (Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas) reported to have a personal fondness for smoking cigarettes, cigars, or pipes. See Frank J.
Murray, High Court Puffing over Laststand Plea on Tobacco Rules, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, at C4;
Tobacco Firms Can’t Hide Behind Warning Labels, HOUSTON CHRON., June 25, 1992, at A1.
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Striking down the restrictions on tobacco ads went too far for
dissenters John Paul Stevens, Ruth Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer.142 They
emphasized above all else the need to be practical rather than purely
idealistic.143 Unlike most other products, tobacco is “addictive and
ultimately lethal for many long-term users.”144 While balancing the First
Amendment concerns against the public health considerations was “no easy
matter,” the dissenters concluded that Massachusetts deserved “some
latitude in imposing restrictions that can have only the slightest impact on
the ability of adults to purchase a poisonous product and may save some
children from taking the first step on the road to addiction.”145
More than any other justice, Stephen Breyer exemplified the pragmatic,
cautious approach to constitutional protection of commercial speech. It was
an approach perfectly in line with his overall theory of constitutional
interpretation, with its emphasis on practical consequences, balancing
interests, judicial modesty, and promoting effective government
policymaking.146 In Breyer’s view, First Amendment analysis must pay
careful attention to context and not shy away from drawing distinctions
between types of speech that merit greater protection and those that deserve
less.147 Freedom of expression serves vital goals, particularly by protecting
the flow of information and debate that sustains sound democratic
decisionmaking.148 Nevertheless, a wide range of laws inevitably limit
speech rights in pursuit of worthy interests like “the absence of anticompetitive restraints; the accuracy of information; the absence of
discrimination; the protection of health, safety, the environment, the
consumer; and so forth.”149 Elevating routine commercial speech to the
highest rung of the free speech ladder would unreasonably limit the public’s
choices about how economic matters should be regulated, dooming the
142. David Souter joined Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer in voting to remand for further factual
development concerning the ban on outdoor advertisements within one thousand feet of schools and
playgrounds, but he joined the majority’s conclusion that the regulation requiring indoor ads to be five
feet above the ground was unconstitutional because it was unlikely to be effective in reducing children’s
exposure to tobacco advertising. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 590 (Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
143. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 599–605 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part).
144. Id. at 599.
145. Id. at 601, 605.
146. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW
(2010) (discussing Breyer’s views on the role of the Court, constitutional interpretation, and the
importance of finding a balance between conflicting views).
147. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 40–41 (2005).
148. See id. at 41–42 (suggesting that absent the First Amendment’s protection of the free
exchange of ideas, the health of the democracy would be at risk).
149. Id. at 40.
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country to a replay of the Lochner era “in modern First Amendment
guise.”150
Breyer’s first significant judicial opinion on commercial speech came
in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center.151 The case concerned a
challenge to a federal law governing pharmacists who compound
prescription drugs, meaning they combine ingredients to make medications
specially tailored to the needs of particular patients.152 For example, a
pharmacist might concoct a special version of a drug for a patient who is
allergic to an ingredient in the mass-marketed varieties of the drug or create
a liquefied version of a drug for patients unable to swallow pills.153
Pharmaceutical manufacturers cannot put a new drug on the market
without first conducting extensive testing and obtaining approval from the
federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA).154 Congress opted not to
apply that regulatory regime to pharmacists’ drug compounding.155 But
while allowing pharmacists to compound drugs without going through the
FDA’s new drug approval process, Congress imposed a variety of
requirements and restrictions on pharmacists’ practices.156 Among other
things, federal law allowed a pharmacy to advertise the fact that it
compounds drugs, but prohibited ads mentioning the availability of any
particular compounded drug.157
The Supreme Court voted 5-4 in Thompson to strike down the ban on
pharmacy advertising referring to specific compounded drugs.158 The
majority concluded that the law failed to satisfy Central Hudson’s
requirement that a commercial speech restriction be no more extensive than
necessary.159 The majority suggested a number of alternative measures that
the government could have employed before resorting to a restraint on
advertising—such as directly regulating compounding so as to limit the
circumstances in which it can be done or limit the amount of any particular
compounded drug that a pharmacist could produce.160
Writing for the dissenters in Thompson, Justice Breyer provided an
archetypical example of his pragmatic approach. He recognized that the
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 41.
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
Id. at 360–61.
Id. at 361, 377.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 362–65.
Id. at 364–65.
Id.
Id. at 366–77.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 372.
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challenged law struck a delicate compromise on a complex and important
regulatory issue.161 Allowing the sale of compounded drugs has benefits and
risks for patients. Compounded drugs are not subject to the extensive
testing and review required by the FDA’s new drug approval regime.162
Congress did not want to prohibit compounded drugs entirely, but it also
did not want to create a loophole allowing pharmacists to produce large
quantities of unregulated drugs and promote their sale to patients without a
genuine medical need for them.163 Ads touting specific compounded drugs
would increase the number of patients who ask their doctors to prescribe
compounded drugs, and some doctors would inevitably yield to those
requests even if they normally would not prescribe the compounded drug.164
By allowing pharmacists to compound drugs but prohibiting specific
advertising about them, Congress struck a sensible balance of the
competing interests at stake.
To the Justices on the majority side of the case, Breyer’s reasoning
reeked of paternalism. In their view, Breyer was simply afraid to trust
doctors and patients, and his defense of the advertising restriction
“amount[ed] to a fear that people would make bad decisions if given
truthful information about compounded drugs.”165
Breyer insisted that he was just being realistic, because evidence shows
that advertising affects consumer demand for prescription drugs and
physicians’ prescribing decisions.166 The government sometimes has good
reasons to be paternalistic, and the majority’s blithe dismissal of concerns
about compounded drug advertising “seriously undervalues the importance
of the Government’s interest in protecting the health and safety of the
American public.”167 More broadly, Breyer recognized that the rigid strains
of anti-paternalism working their way into the Court’s commercial speech
jurisprudence threatened a “tragic constitutional misunderstanding” of
Lochnerian proportions.168 In Breyer’s view, commercial speech should be
subject to a more flexible and lenient approach, “an application that reflects
the need for distinctions among contexts, forms of regulation, and forms of
speech.”169 While censorship of other types of speech infringes on
individual self-expression and impairs democratic processes, government
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 378, 382–83.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 374 (O’Connor, J., opinion of the Court).
Id. at 383–84 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 389.
Id.
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restrictions on commercial speech usually represent sound legislative or
regulatory determinations about the best way to protect public health and
safety.170 Those determinations, Breyer argued, deserved more deference
from judges than the Court’s majority in Thompson was willing to give.171
William Rehnquist joined Breyer’s dissent in Thompson—the moment
was like a passing of the baton between the two men.172 For more than a
quarter of a century, Rehnquist had been the Supreme Court’s principal
voice of skepticism about commercial speech rights. Thompson would turn
out to be one of the last commercial speech cases that he would hear, and
Breyer was there to carry on the cause in Rehnquist’s stead.
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision about commercial speech
confirmed where the battle lines have been drawn. In Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., the Court struck down a Vermont law restricting the transfer and use
of information about doctors and the prescriptions they write.173
Pharmaceutical manufacturers market their products by sending sales
representatives to visit doctors. The sales representatives can tailor the sales
pitch and be more effective if they know a lot about each doctor’s
prescription-writing habits, such as which drugs the doctor prescribes most
often.174 To get that information, the manufacturers turn to reports prepared
by firms know as “data miners.”175 The data miners purchase the
information that goes into these reports from pharmacies, which gather data
about doctors in the course of filling prescriptions.176 Concerned that the
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ marketing efforts had become too
aggressive and intrusive, the Vermont legislature enacted a law prohibiting
pharmacies from selling data for use in drug marketing or promotion efforts
without the prescribing doctor’s consent.177
The anti-paternalist impulse prevailed at the Supreme Court, which
held that Vermont had no legitimate interest in trying to cut off a means by
which drug manufacturers’ sales representatives could influence doctors.178
Vermont worried that a sales representative armed with detailed
information about a doctor’s prescription-writing practices would be able to
unduly pressure the doctor and subvert future decisions about which drugs

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
Id. at 2659.
Id. at 2660.
Id.
Id. at 2660–61, 2668.
Id. at 2670.
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to prescribe.179 But in the Court’s view, that amounted to nothing more than
a fear that doctors will make bad decisions if exposed to true information.180
“If pharmaceutical marketing affects treatment decisions,” the Court
concluded, “it does so because doctors find it persuasive,” and “the fear that
speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it.”181
Writing for the dissenters in Sorrell, Justice Breyer once again
preached the need for pragmatic assessment of the challenged law’s actual
effects.182 The Vermont statute “neither forbids nor requires anyone to say
anything.”183 Although the law could diminish the effectiveness of drug
makers’ sales efforts to some extent, the harm was “modest at most.”184 The
law certainly posed no real threat to the First Amendment’s protection of
the marketplace of ideas, for it did not suppress any ideas or prevent anyone
from fully participating in the debate and determination of public policy.185
In Breyer’s view, Vermont lawmakers had legitimate concerns about
the use of information that data miners acquired from pharmacies.186 When
a manufacturer’s sales representative talks to a doctor, the conversation
should focus on general, neutral information about the drug and its risks and
benefits.187 That does not require the manufacturer to know what
prescriptions the doctor has written most often in the past or any other
information gleaned through the data mining process.188 Although having
specific information about each doctor’s practices might help drug makers
increase their sales, it would not advance the interests of doctors, patients,
or the public.189 Vermont’s lawmakers compiled a “substantial legislative
record” supporting their conclusions, and Breyer saw no reason for judges
to second-guess them.190
Finally, Breyer emphasized that Vermont’s restriction on the use of
prescriber data for marketing purposes was but one part of “a traditional,
comprehensive regulatory regime” governing all aspects of prescription
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2670–71.
181. Id. at 2670.
182. See id. at 2673 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (arguing that Vermont’s statute “adversely affects
expression in one, and only one way” by “depriv[ing] pharmaceutical and data mining companies of
data . . . that could help [them] create better sales messages”).
183. Id. at 2675.
184. Id. at 2681.
185. Id. at 2679.
186. See id. at 2681 (describing Vermont’s statute as serving legitimate state interests, such as
“public health” and “privacy” (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(a) (2012)).
187. Id. at 2682.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. (“[I]t is the job of regulatory agencies and legislatures to make just these kinds of
judgments.”).
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drug distribution.191 Breyer warned again that if the Supreme Court
launched a crusade against every incidental way in which ordinary
commercial regulations and economic programs affect speech, the results
would be disastrous.192 The nation would be thrown back to the Lochner era
and its regrettable judicial usurpation of legislative authority.193 Echoing the
mythological allusion that William Rehnquist employed in Central
Hudson,194 Breyer warned that the Court’s dogmatic inflexibility on
commercial speech issues threatened to open “a Pandora’s Box of First
Amendment challenges.”195
The Supreme Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence thus remains
an unsettled and hotly disputed terrain. In the most superficial sense, the
rules governing the area have been quite stable. For more than thirty years,
the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson has been the test for
government actions that restrict commercial speech,196 and, for almost that
long, Zauderer has provided the rule for government-mandated disclosures
and other types of compelled commercial speech.197 But beneath that
illusion of stability lies tremendous uncertainty. Intense debate continues
about how to apply the existing tests, whether they should be discarded, and
what would replace them.
The difficulty of predicting the Supreme Court’s future course in this
realm is exacerbated by the fact that the debate over commercial speech has
not consistently divided along conventional ideological lines. The archconservative Clarence Thomas now takes the hardest line in favor of
elevating the constitutional protection of commercial speech, but he
inherited that mantle from liberals like Harry Blackmun and John Paul
Stevens.198 On the other side of the field, left-leaning Stephen Breyer is now
the Court’s leading skeptic of commercial speech rights, a role previously
played by the conservative stalwart William Rehnquist.199 The issue defies
simple liberal/conservative classifications, making it unusually difficult to
forecast the direction in which the seven justices currently drifting between
Thomas’s and Breyer’s positions will wind up moving.
191. Id. at 2676.
192. See id. at 2674–75 (“[T]he same First Amendment standards that apply to Vermont would
apply to similar regulatory actions taken by other States or by the Federal Government.”); see also id. at
2677–78 (adding that the creation of “constitutional barriers” to regulation would affect “widely
accepted” agencies, including the Federal Reserve, the FDA, and electricity regulators).
193. Id. at 2675, 2679, 2685.
194. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
195. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2685 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. See supra notes 69–75 and 133–134 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 89-98 and 135–136 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 120–136 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 146–171 and accompanying text.

554

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 37:527

II. NEW CONTROVERSIES IN THE LOWER COURTS
While the Supreme Court’s rulings obviously have a major impact and
receive widespread attention, the vast bulk of constitutional adjudication
plays out in the lower courts. In recent years, those courts have grappled
with a variety of vexing commercial speech issues. The remainder of this
Article looks at several of the most interesting topics of recent controversy,
with a particular emphasis on how the competing themes of pragmatism and
anti-paternalism run through the courts’ reasoning.
A. Promotion of Off-Label Drug Uses
The FDA has struggled for years to reconcile the free speech interests
of pharmaceutical companies with the government’s obligation to protect
public health by overseeing and controlling the marketing and sale of drugs.
In several recent policy statements, the Agency has done a commendable
job of attempting to accommodate First Amendment concerns while
maintaining sound limits on manufacturers’ marketing activities.200
The First Amendment issues that have bedeviled the FDA relate
principally to speech concerning “off-label” uses of drugs. A new drug
cannot be sold without the FDA’s approval.201 To obtain that approval, the
manufacturer must submit testing data and other information establishing
that the drug is both safe and effective.202 When the FDA approves a drug,
it specifies the particular medical uses for which the drug can be sold.203 For
example, the FDA might approve “Drug XYZ” to be sold for treatment of
high blood pressure in adults. The drug’s labeling (such as the information
on the drug’s packaging or on inserts inside the package) will reflect and
provide instructions concerning the approved uses.204 Any use of the drug
that goes beyond the approved uses on the label is considered an off-label
use.205 For example, using the hypothetical “Drug XYZ” to treat migraine
200. FDA, Guidance for Industry—Good Reprint Practice for the Distribution of Medical
Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved Drugs and Approved
or Cleared Medical Devices, 74 Fed. Reg. 1694 (Jan. 13, 2009); FDA, Guidance for Industry—
Responding to Unsolicited Requests for Off-Label Information About Prescription Drugs and Medical
Devices, 76 Fed. Reg. 82303 (Dec. 30, 2011).
201. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
202. Id. § 355(b)(1).
203. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1998) (describing how
Congress amended 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) in 1962 to make clear “that all uses for a drug must obtain FDA
approval”), appeal dismissed & judgment vacated in part sub nom., Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202
F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
204. Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
205. Id.
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headaches or cardiac arrhythmias, as opposed to high blood pressure in
adults, would be an off-label use. Additional off-label uses would include
treating children, using it in higher doses, or using it in any other ways
outside the scope of the directions for the drug’s use appearing in its FDAapproved labeling.
Off-label use of drugs has both substantial risks and important potential
benefits. The worst-case scenario is that an off-label use of the drug will
cause serious injuries or deaths.206 For example, the off-label use may pose
a danger that would have been detected by the extensive testing required if
the manufacturer had gone to the FDA to obtain approval for its new use. In
addition, even if an off-label use is not dangerous, it may be ineffective.
Patients suffer harm if they waste time and money taking a useless drug,
particularly if the off-label drug use takes the place of an alternative drug
regimen that would have been effective.207 Critics of off-label use thus
contend that it essentially amounts to conducting dangerous medical
experiments on the public.208
On the other hand, off-label use may be an enormously valuable way
for doctors to accelerate the availability of new treatment options for
patients who need them. The FDA approval process is long and
expensive.209 If doctors had to wait for the manufacturer and the FDA to
complete that process every time someone discovered a new use for a drug,
many patients would be harmed by their inability to immediately receive
drugs that their doctors recommend.210
Faced with these competing interests, federal law has struck a
compromise. Off-label use of drugs is perfectly legal.211 In other words, a
doctor is free to treat a patient with whatever drug the doctor chooses, even
if that use of the drug falls outside the uses for which the FDA approved the
drug.212 But, on the other hand, federal law makes it a crime for a
manufacturer to sell a drug with the intent that it be used for an off-label
purpose.213 The crime becomes a felony if it is done with intent to defraud
206. Id. at 56.
207. Id. at 56–57.
208. Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An
Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 204 (1999).
209. See Allen Rostron, Prescription for Fairness: A New Approach to Tort Liability of BrandName and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 60 DUKE L.J. 1123, 1130–31 & nn. 15–17 (2011) (noting that
the approval process for a new drug takes an average of eight-and-a-half years and typically costs many
millions of dollars).
210. Id. at 1130.
211. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
212. Id. at 333.
213. Federal law prohibits selling a drug that is “misbranded.” 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 352 (2006).
A drug is misbranded if its labeling does not bear “adequate directions for use.” Id. § 352(f).
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or mislead,214 and the manufacturer’s potential financial liability for fines
and penalties can run into the millions or even billions of dollars.215
Congress and the FDA thus have taken the position that off-label use of
drugs should be a choice that doctors are free to make, but it is a choice that
manufacturers should not encourage. As a result, if a manufacturer wants to
promote an off-label use, it must first go back to the FDA and go through
the process of obtaining approval so that the off-label use becomes an onlabel use.216 This regulatory approach may seem asymmetrical, but it
protects patients and doctors from having treatment options curtailed, while
maintaining incentives for manufacturers to seek FDA approval for new
uses of drugs.
This compromise approach to the regulation of off-label drug use leads
to a First Amendment dilemma. Each manufacturer knows that doctors can
use products for off-label purposes, but the manufacturer cannot market the
products for those purposes. To what extent can the manufacturer talk about
off-label uses of a drug without crossing the line into illegal promotion of
such uses? And if the manufacturer cannot talk about off-label uses without
risking punishment, does that violate the manufacturer’s freedom of
speech?
From an anti-paternalism perspective, a drug manufacturer’s
expression about off-label drug uses deserves strong protection as long as it
is not false or misleading. Suppose, for example, that a team of research
scientists writes an article for a medical journal about how some doctors
have begun prescribing a certain drug for a use not approved by the FDA.
The drug’s manufacturer would obviously like to spread the word about the
discovery, for example, by having its sales representatives distribute copies
of the article to doctors. The government might be afraid to let the
manufacturer do so. The manufacturer’s distribution of the article would
Consequently, if a manufacturer intentionally promotes off-label uses of a drug, it is guilty of
misbranding because it is selling the drug for uses not covered by the directions in the drug’s labeling.
See Wash. Legal Found., 202 F.3d at 332–33.
214. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2).
215. For example, the British drug company GlaxoSmithKline agreed to pay a record $3 billion
in fines when it pled guilty to promoting off-label use of antidepressant drugs like Paxil and Wellbutrin.
Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Drug Firm Guilty in Criminal Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-billion-in-fraudsettlement.html?scp=1&sq=Drug+Firm+Guilty+in+Criminal+Case&st=nyt.
216. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b)(1), (j)(1) (prohibiting the introduction of a new drug into
interstate commerce, unless approved by the FDA); see also Guidance for Industry—Good Reprint
Practice for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference
Publications on Unapproved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, 74 Fed. Reg. 1694 (Jan.
13, 2009) (“An approved new drug that is marketed for an unapproved use is an unapproved new drug
with respect to that use.”).
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increase the drug’s off-label use, putting more patients at risk in the event
that the off-label use turns out to be dangerous or ineffective. A steadfastly
anti-paternalist judge like Clarence Thomas would not let the government
censor the manufacturer’s speech on that basis. In his view, the First
Amendment prevents the government from trying to hide information
because it thinks the public would be better off not knowing the truth. The
government should not be permitted “to keep legal users of a product or
service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace.”217
The more information that doctors have, the better. And it would be
particularly perverse to single out and silence the drug’s manufacturer, for
that company would presumably be the most knowledgeable of all sources
of information about the product.218
Not surprisingly, this anti-paternalist line of reasoning can be found in
court decisions on the promotion of off-label uses. In particular, it was an
important element of Judge Royce Lamberth’s influential rulings in a late1990s lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
by a conservative legal center, the Washington Legal Foundation.219 The
lawsuit charged that the FDA’s policies violated drug manufacturers’
freedom of speech, such as by limiting the manufacturers’ ability to
distribute reprints of articles discussing off-label uses or sponsor medical
conferences at which off-label uses would be discussed.220 In the course of
applying the Central Hudson test, Judge Lamberth emphatically rejected
the notion that the FDA could censor the drug makers’ speech in order to
stop doctors from receiving information they might misuse.221 According to
Judge Lamberth, the Supreme Court’s commercial speech rulings have
“repeatedly rejected governmental attempts to equate less information with
better decision-making.”222 He concluded that “[t]o endeavor to support a
restriction upon speech by alleging that the recipient needs to be shielded
from that speech for his or her own protection, which is the gravamen of
FDA’s claim here, is practically an engraved invitation to have the
restriction struck.”223
217. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
218. See United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that
manufacturers should not be censored when doctors and everyone else in society is permitted to freely
discuss off-label uses of a drug).
219. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998), appeal dismissed &
judgment vacated in part sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
220. Id. at 57–58.
221. Id. at 69–70.
222. Id. at 70.
223. Id.
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Judge Lamberth ruled that the FDA’s policies were unnecessarily
restrictive and therefore unconstitutional.224 He declared that rather than
trying to prohibit manufacturers from distributing information, the FDA
should simply ensure that the information would always be accompanied by
“full, complete, and unambiguous disclosure by the manufacturer.”225 For
example, the FDA could require a manufacturer distributing articles or
sponsoring conferences about a drug’s off-label use to make a clear
disclosure of its financial interest in the drug and the fact that the FDA has
not approved the off-label use.226
One can easily imagine the alternative conclusions that a judge like
Stephen Breyer might reach, emphasizing the need for greater deference to
the FDA’s expertise on an issue that is tremendously complex and has very
significant practical consequences. Everything that Breyer said in his
dissent in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, about deferring to
the FDA’s concerns about pharmacy advertising of compounded drugs,
would apply with even greater force to restrictions on drug manufacturers’
promotion of unapproved drug uses.227 Drug safety issues can literally be
matters of life and death, and courts should not undervalue the
government’s interest in public health and safety or overstate the
importance of the manufacturers’ ability to promote their commercial
interests.
The federal government appealed Judge Lamberth’s ruling, setting the
stage for the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to decide “a difficult
constitutional question of considerable practical importance.”228 The D.C.
Circuit never got the chance to decide the issue, however, because the
government opted to back off and try to make peace with the drug
manufacturers. The government’s lawyers announced that the challenged
policies had been profoundly misunderstood.229 Contrary to what had been
assumed throughout the litigation, the policies did not impose any
mandatory limits or restrictions on the manufacturers. Instead, the policies
merely created an optional “safe harbor” that manufacturers could choose to
use.230 If a manufacturer’s distribution of journal articles and sponsorship of
conferences stayed within the safe harbor guidelines, the government would
not use those activities as evidence if it ever charged the manufacturer with
224. Id. at 74.
225. Id. at 73.
226. Id. at 75.
227. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 384–85 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
see supra notes 161–170 and accompanying text.
228. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
229. Id. at 335.
230. Id.
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intentionally selling a drug for off-label uses.231 But no manufacturer was
under any obligation to take advantage of the safe harbor’s protections. As a
result of that clarification of the government’s position, the D.C. Circuit
dismissed the case as presenting no justiciable case or controversy.232
The FDA thus made a major strategic shift to try to improve its odds in
the First Amendment battle over off-label drug uses. Rather than directly
imposing legal limits on what drug makers can say, the government put its
focus on what drug makers do, vowing that a manufacturer would be
punished only if its conduct amounted to intentionally selling a drug for offlabel uses.233 Of course, the manufacturers’ speech might be crucial
evidence supporting such a charge, so the government was still in the
business of policing drug makers’ speech in an indirect way. But the
government hoped that its indirect regulation of manufacturers’ speech
would prove to be less vulnerable to First Amendment attack than the more
direct and blatant types of speech restriction that Judge Lamberth had found
objectionable. Defendants charged with promoting off-label uses
nevertheless continued to raise First Amendment challenges to the FDA’s
approach.234
Shortly before President George W. Bush’s administration left office in
January 2009, the FDA finalized new recommendations for manufacturers
distributing reprints of medical journal articles or other scientific
publications referring to off-label drug uses.235 The FDA emphasized that it
is a crime for manufacturers to promote off-label uses, but simultaneously
recognized both “the important public health and policy justification
supporting dissemination of truthful and non-misleading” information to
doctors and the fact that “off-label uses or treatment regimens may be
important and may even constitute a medically recognized standard of
care.”236 The FDA basically urged manufacturers to distribute only sound
scientific information in a neutral manner. For example, an article
distributed by a manufacturer should come from a peer-reviewed
231. Id.
232. Id. at 336–37.
233. Guidance for Industry—Good Reprint Practice for the Distribution of Medical Journal
Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved Drugs and Approved or
Cleared Medical Devices, 74 Fed. Reg. 1694 (Jan. 13, 2009).
234. Compare United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 919, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting
First Amendment challenge to prosecution for selling a misbranded medical device), with United States
v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 938–940 (7th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that drug manufacturers might have a
First Amendment right to promote off-label drug uses, but finding it unnecessary to reach that question).
235. Guidance for Industry—Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal
Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs and
Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, 74 Fed. Reg. 1694.
236. Id.
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publication with an editorial board of independent experts.237 Along with
the reprinted article, the manufacturer should provide a copy of the drug’s
labeling and a comprehensive bibliography of other articles about the
drug.238 If the reprinted article conflicts with other published studies, the
manufacturer should provide a copy of a representative example of one of
the other publications so that doctors see both sides of the debate.239 The
FDA also emphasized the need for full disclosure, telling manufacturers
that the reprinted articles they distribute should have statements
prominently and permanently affixed to them informing recipients that the
article describes uses not approved by the FDA and informing them about
any risks known to the manufacturer concerning the off-label use.240 Again,
these guidelines are not mandatory, but a manufacturer complying with
them would not risk having its dissemination of articles used as evidence
that the manufacturer intentionally sold a drug for off-label use.241
Congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle criticized the
guidelines, saying they opened the door too widely for manufacturers to
push off-label uses under the guise of merely distributing unbiased medical
information.242 But the FDA professed that it was doing its best to balance
the public’s health interests and the manufacturers’ and doctors’ free speech
rights.243 After the Obama administration took office, the FDA continued
the same basic approach. For example, the FDA proposed new guidelines in
December 2011 for manufacturers wondering how to handle unsolicited
requests for information about off-label uses, particularly requests received
through emerging electronic media such as Twitter or Facebook.244 Again,
the FDA’s draft guidance struck a balance, trying to craft an approach under
which manufacturers could safely provide “truthful, balanced, nonmisleading, and non-promotional scientific or medical information that is
responsive to the specific request.”245

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 230–232 and accompanying text.
See Chris Adams, Late Move on Drugs by Bush FDA Could Be Dangerous, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS, Feb. 1, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/02/01/61113/late-move-on-drugs-bybush-fda.html (quoting Senator Charles Grassley, an Iowa Republican, and Representative Henry
Waxman, a California Democrat).
243. Id.
244. Guidance for Industry—Responding to Unsolicited Requests for Off-Label Information
About Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices, 76 Fed. Reg. 82303 (Dec. 30, 2011).
245. FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY—RESPONDING TO UNSOLICITED REQUESTS FOR
OFF-LABEL INFORMATION ABOUT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES 6 (Dec. 2011).
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The FDA’s handling of the off-label drug issue thus illustrates how the
judiciary is not necessarily the only branch of government interested in
preserving commercial speech rights. Although surely driven in part by the
risk that courts might invalidate more drastic restrictions, the FDA’s actions
also seem to reflect a genuine belief that the manufacturer’s speech has
value and can be reconciled with adequate safeguards to protect the public’s
health interests.
The FDA nevertheless may not have the last word on the commercial
speech rights of drug makers, for litigation continues to percolate in the
lower courts. In particular, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a
major decision on the issue in late 2012.246 The case concerned Alfred
Caronia, who worked as a sales representative for a pharmaceutical
company that marketed Xyrem, a powerful central nervous system
depressant approved by the FDA for treatment of narcolepsy and “excessive
daytime sleepiness” disorder.247 In conversations audio-recorded by doctors
cooperating with government investigators, Caronia promoted the use of
Xyrem for unapproved uses such as treating fibromyalgia, muscle disorders,
and chronic pain.248 A federal jury found Caronia guilty of conspiring to
introduce a misbranded drug into interstate commerce.249 By a 2-1 vote, the
Second Circuit overturned the conviction, emphasizing that it makes little
sense to prohibit drug manufacturers and their representatives from making
true statements about off-label drug uses when it is perfectly legal for
doctors to prescribe drugs for off-label uses.250 That approach “legalizes the
outcome—off-label use—but prohibits the free flow of information that
would inform that outcome” 251 and thus “‘paternalistically’ interferes with
the ability of physicians and patients to receive potentially relevant
treatment information.”252
Many observers portrayed the Caronia decision as “big, big news,”
predicting that it “could dramatically expand the free-speech rights of
pharmaceutical companies.”253 Some suggested, for example, that the case
246. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012) (agreeing with
pharmaceutical sales representatives that the First Amendment protects promotion of an FDA-approved
drug for off-label uses).
247. Id. at 155. Xyrem’s active ingredient is gamma-hydroxybutryate or GHB, also known as
the “date rape drug.” Id.
248. Id. at 156–57.
249. Id. at 159.
250. Id. at 164–69.
251. Id. at 167.
252. Id. at 166 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976)).
253. David Frum, Drug Industry’s Free Speech Helps Doctors, CNN (Dec. 10, 2012, 2:00 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/10/opinion/frum-off-label-use-of-drugs/index.html; see also Eric F.
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would force federal regulators to narrow their focus and bring charges only
where they can show that a drug company’s off-label promotions were false
or misleading.254 But the Caronia decision can be read in a way that
produces more of a pyrrhic victory for drug makers than a real triumph.255
The government argued that it sought to punish Caronia only for his
conduct, not his speech.256 In other words, his crime was conspiring to sell a
misbranded drug—a drug intended to be used in ways for which its labeling
did not contain instructions.257 His statements promoting off-label use of the
drug were not a crime in and of themselves, but instead merely served as
evidence of his intent to misbrand the drug.258 The Second Circuit rejected
this characterization, finding that the prosecutors in fact presented the case
to the jury on the theory that Caronia’s speech was illegal and not mere
evidence of his intent to sell the misbranded drug.259 But the court assumed,
without actually deciding the question, that the conviction would have been
valid if the prosecutors had been more careful about how they characterized
Caronia’s offense.260 Prosecutors simply needed to tell the jury that
“Caronia is guilty because his statements about off-label uses of the drug
show he had the intent to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate
commerce” rather than merely saying “Caronia is guilty because he made
statements promoting off-label uses of the drug.” If that semantic shift is
sufficient to get around the problem, Caronia does not actually represent a
significant hurdle to future prosecutions.
The Caronia decision nevertheless increases the odds that the Supreme
Court eventually has the opportunity to rule on the underlying question of
whether drug makers have a First Amendment right to promote off-label
uses of their products. Justice Breyer has already indicated, albeit only in
dicta, that he would vote in the government’s favor in such a case. In his
Greenberg, Label This Free Speech Decision a Very Big Deal, PACKAGING WORLD (Jan. 4, 2013),
http://www.packworld.com/label-free-speech-decision-very-big-deal (“I’m not saying the world as we
know it is about to end, but a big court just reached a big decision that might overturn [the] FDA’s
whole regulatory apple cart.”).
254. Caronia Ruling Could Unravel 1962 Drug Law, but Near-Term Impact Unclear, FDA
NEWS, Dec. 14, 2012; Defense Lawyers Predict No FDA Action on Caronia, Say Off-Label Guidance
Crucial, DRUG INDUS. DAILY, Dec. 14, 2012.
255. The FDA has made clear that it does not regard Caronia as dramatically diminishing its
authority to bring civil or criminal actions against drug makers for off-label marketing. FDA to Let
Caronia Stand; Agency Will Factor Ruling into Guidance Development, DRUG INDUS. DAILY, Jan. 31,
2013.
256. See Caronia, 730 F.3d at 160–61 (reciting the government’s argument that Caronia was not
prosecuted for his speech but, rather, that his speech served as evidence of intent).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 162 & n.9.
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dissent in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,261 Breyer argued that regulatory
programs often justifiably result in regulated firms being subject to speech
restrictions that do not apply to other individuals or entities.262 As one of his
examples, Breyer explained that the FDA can prohibit a drug manufacturer
from encouraging off-label use “even if the manufacturer, in good faith and
with considerable evidence, believes the drug will help.”263
Drugs can do enormous good, but they can also pose potentially
catastrophic risks, and so pharmaceutical regulation is the sort of complex
and vitally important government undertaking for which Breyer’s brand of
deferential pragmatism should be ideally suited. But in other respects, the
issue of off-label drug promotion seems tailor-made for Clarence Thomas’s
devout anti-paternalism. Doctors are highly trained experts. If the
government cannot trust them to make good use of an unrestricted flow of
true information about medications, who can be trusted? If the issue ever
comes before the Supreme Court, it should go a long way toward showing
whether the pragmatic or anti-paternalist perspective ultimately comes to
dominate the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence.
B. Tobacco
While pharmaceutical products have tremendous potential benefits as
well as serious risks, tobacco raises intriguing First Amendment issues
because it is so unequivocally and severely dangerous. Tobacco causes so
much death and disease—with so little offsetting utility—that governments
are quite understandably tempted to restrict tobacco advertising in ways that
they would not consider restricting advertising for any other product.
The federal government has limited the commercial speech of tobacco
companies for almost half a century. In 1965, the United States became the
first nation to require health warnings on cigarette packages.264 The wording
of the required warnings was mild (“Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be
Hazardous to Your Health”) and the law protected tobacco companies from
being required to put any health warnings in their advertising.265 A few
years later, Congress strengthened the language of the warnings (“Warning:
The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is
261. For more detailed discussion of the Sorrell case, see supra notes 173–195 and
accompanying text.
262. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2678 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
263. Id.
264. Duff Wilson, U.S. Releases Graphic Images to Deter Smokers, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/health/policy/22smoke.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print.
265. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, §§ 4, 5(b), 79 Stat.
282, 283 (1965).
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Dangerous to Your Health”) and prohibited radio and television
advertisements for tobacco.266 Concluding that those measures had not done
enough to change public attitudes toward smoking, Congress enacted
legislation in 1984 creating a set of four warnings for cigarette packaging
and print or outdoor advertising.267 Rotated so that consumers do not grow
accustomed to seeing the same warning all the time, the four warnings refer
to specific risks such as cancer, carbon monoxide, and smoking during
pregnancy.268
As the health risks of tobacco became increasingly well known, the
percentage of Americans using tobacco decreased substantially.269 But even
with its use declining, tobacco continues to be an enormous public health
hazard. Tobacco is the leading preventable cause of death and disease,
killing approximately 443,000 people in the United States per year.270 The
economic toll is staggering as well, with tobacco accounting for an
estimated $96 billion in medical costs and $97 billion in lost productivity
each year.271 Despite the risks, about one in five adult Americans smokes
cigarettes.272 Over eighty percent of them became addicted to tobacco at or
before reaching the age of eighteen.273 Each day, about 4,000 Americans
under eighteen try their first cigarette and another 1,500 begin smoking on a
daily basis.274

266. See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87, 88, 89
(1970) (changing the language of the act from “may be” to “is”).
267. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200, 2201–
02 (1984) (stating that it “shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or import for sale or
distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which fails to bear” one of the four
required labels).
268. Id.
269. Per capita consumption of tobacco in the United States has decreased steadily since the
1960s. See David M. Burns et al., Cigarette Smoking Behavior in the United States, in CHANGES IN
CIGARETTE-RELATED DISEASE RISKS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVENTION AND CONTROL 13
(1997) (No. 8 in the National Cancer Institute’s Tobacco Control Monograph Series), available at
http://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/tcrb/monographs/8/m8_complete.pdf (charting per capita tobacco
consumption in the United States between 1880 and 1995).
270. SMOKING & TOBACCO USE: FAST FACTS, CDC (June 7, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/
tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts/.
271. Id.
272. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, VITAL SIGNS: CURRENT CIGARETTE
SMOKING AMONG ADULTS AGED ≥ 18 YEARS—UNITED STATES, 2005–2010 (Sept. 9, 2011), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6035a5.htm?s_cid=mm6035a5_w.
273. SUZANNE H. REUBEN, PRESIDENT’S CANCER PANEL, NAT’L CANCER INST., PROMOTING
HEALTHY LIFESTYLES: POLICY, PROGRAM, AND PERSONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING
CANCER RISK 64 (2007), available at http://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/advisory/pcp/annualReports/pcp07rpt/
pcp07rpt.pdf.
274. Id.
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During President Bill Clinton’s administration, the FDA asserted for
the first time that it had jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.275 The
FDA began issuing regulations imposing new restrictions on the sale and
marketing of tobacco.276 For example, the regulations prohibited the sale of
cigarettes to persons under eighteen and required retailers to check photo
identification of purchasers to verify their age.277 On the marketing side, the
FDA regulations required print advertisements for tobacco products to be in
a black-and-white text format, with no color or graphic imagery, unless the
ad appeared in a publication read almost exclusively by adults.278 The
regulations also prohibited outdoor ads within 1,000 feet of playgrounds or
schools, prohibited the distribution of promotional items featuring tobacco
brand names, and prohibited tobacco companies from sponsoring sporting
events or music concerts.279 Under the FDA’s rules, the Surgeon General’s
warning on tobacco packaging would be supplemented by a further
description of the product as a “Nicotine Delivery Device for Persons 18 or
Older.”280
The Supreme Court concluded that the FDA had overstepped its
authority and that Congress had intended to keep tobacco products outside
the FDA’s jurisdiction.281 Congress overrode the Supreme Court’s decision
by enacting the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of
2009.282 In addition to giving the FDA authority to regulate tobacco
products, the statute specifically provided for tougher warnings and
advertising restrictions.283 The legislation replaced the previous set of four
rotating warning statements with a new group of nine.284 The text of the
new warnings, consisting of blunt statements like “Cigarettes are addictive”
275. Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are Nicotine
Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61
Fed. Reg. 44,619 (1996).
276. See, e.g., Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,396 (Aug. 28, 1996) (“[I]ssuing
regulations governing access to and promotion of nicotine-containing cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
to children and adolescents.”).
277. Id. at 44,399.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 44,464 (internal quotation marks omitted).
281. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 128, 144 (2000). The vote was
5-4, with Justice Breyer writing the dissent for the Court’s liberal faction. See id. at 161–92 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
282. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 101(b)(3),
123 Stat. 1776, 1786–88 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387a(a)).
283. See id. § 201(a), 123 Stat. at 1842–43 (requiring cigarette packaging and advertising to bear
one of the specified warnings).
284. Id. § 201(a), 123 Stat. at 1842–43 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)).
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and “Smoking can kill you,” was not substantially new or different from
what was previously required.285 The new law, however, dramatically
increased the visibility of the warnings, requiring that they cover the top
half of both the front and rear of each cigarette package.286 The law also
called for the addition of graphic images to accompany the text of the
warnings.287 Specifically, the law gave the Department of Health & Human
Services twenty-four months in which to produce “regulations that require
color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smoking to
accompany the label statements.”288
In addition to requiring the enhanced warnings, the 2009 legislation put
tight new constraints on tobacco advertising, most of which were the same
measures that the FDA had first tried to implement in 1996.289 Under the
new law, the advertising and labeling of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products can contain only black text on a white background.290 The law thus
prohibited tobacco companies from using colors, symbols, logos,
photographs, or other graphic images on labels or in advertising. The law
provided exceptions for advertising inside adults-only establishments and in
publications proven by survey data to have few readers under the age of
eighteen.291
Congress also cracked down on the marketing of tobacco products as
being “light,” “mild,” “low,” or otherwise posing a reduced health risk.292
The law prohibited the sale of such a “modified risk tobacco product”
unless the manufacturer proves to the FDA’s satisfaction that the product
would significantly reduce the risk of disease, and that its sale would
benefit public health.293

285. Id. (amending 15 U.S.C §1333(a)–(b), which required cigarette packages and
advertisements to bear warnings, such as “Cigarettes cause cancer” and “Smoking during pregnancy can
harm your baby”).
286. Id. (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)). For print and outdoor advertising, the warnings
appear at the top of the ad and occupy at least one-fifth of the overall ad space. See id. (amending 15
U.S.C. § 1333(b) and requiring the warning to occupy twenty percent of the advertisement).
287. Id. § 201(a), 123 Stat. at 1845 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)).
288. Id.
289. See Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520 & n.2 (W.D.
Ky. 2010), aff’d in part & rev’d in part sub nom. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States,
674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Oct. 26, 2012) (No. 12-521,
12A102). For example, the law barred tobacco companies from sponsoring sporting events or concerts,
giving away free samples or promotional items featuring tobacco brand names, or advertising on
billboard within 1,000 feet of a school or playground. Id. at 520.
290. Id. at 519, 521–22.
291. Id. at 522.
292. Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 101, 123 Stat. at 1812 (creating 21 U.S.C. § 911(a)-(b)).
293. Id. § 101, 123 Stat. at 1812, 1814 (creating 21 U.S.C. § 911(g)(1)).
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Shortly after the 2009 legislation’s enactment, tobacco companies
brought suit in federal court in Kentucky, claiming that the new warning
requirements and advertising restrictions violated their freedom of
speech.294 The case worked its way up to the Sixth Circuit, which upheld
most of the law but struck down two parts of it.295
First, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the government had not
sufficiently justified its ban on “continuity programs” such as “Camel
Cash” or “Marlboro Miles,” in which customers earn points for each
package of cigarettes purchased and can redeem those points for free items
like t-shirts, lighters, or ash trays.296 The government cited several studies
from the mid-1990s indicating that a substantial percentage of adolescents
owned branded clothing or other promotional items distributed by tobacco
companies, but the Sixth Circuit concluded that this was weak proof that the
continuity programs actually increase rates of tobacco use among
juveniles.297
In addition, the Sixth Circuit struck down the portion of the law
requiring that tobacco packaging and advertising contain nothing but black
text on a white background.298 The court reasoned that the government went
too far by imposing a “sweeping and complete ban” on all uses of color or
imagery, rather than selectively prohibiting only marketing efforts that
utilize color or graphics in ways that target young people.299 A tobacco
company, for example, should be entitled to use color or images merely to
help customers spot their preferred brand in a crowded marketplace.300
The Sixth Circuit upheld the law’s new requirements for warning
labels.301 The court concluded that the text of the warnings consists entirely
of uncontroversial facts.302 For example, tobacco companies no longer
dispute that their products pose serious health risks.303 Although the new
law significantly increased the size of the warnings—so that they would
occupy the top half of the front and back of every package—the
294. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 521.
295. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2012),
petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Oct. 26, 2012) (No. 12-521, 12A102).
296. Id. at 543–44; see Artifacts of the Tobacco Epidemic—Brand Loyalty, TRINKETS & TRASH,
http://trinketsandtrash.org/visual_exhibits/visual_exhibits_loyalty.html (last visited April 9, 2013)
(displaying various programs used by tobacco companies over the years to encourage use of their
products).
297. Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 544.
298. Id. at 544–48.
299. Id. at 548.
300. Id. at 547.
301. Id. at 552–69.
302. Id. at 558.
303. Id.
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government adequately justified this as a reasonable way to enhance
visibility.304 Moreover, the court felt that adding a graphic component to the
warnings was also a legitimate step, at least as a general matter. The case
involved only a facial challenge to the statute, and therefore the question
before the court was merely whether the government could come up with
some type of graphic warnings about smoking that would pass
constitutional muster.305 The court could easily imagine satisfactory
graphics, such as a picture of a person suffering from a smoking-related
disease, or a picture of a doctor looking at an x-ray of a smoker’s cancerous
lungs.306
With the Sixth Circuit upholding the general idea of graphic warnings,
other litigation focused on the particular images that the FDA decided to
use. The FDA initially came up with thirty-six graphic, color images and
invited feedback on them.307 The FDA also conducted a study in which
some participants were shown a cigarette package or advertisement with
one of the proposed graphic images and a text warning, while other
participants were shown a package or ad with only the text warning.308 The
participants then answered questions about their reactions to the warning
and their attitudes and beliefs about smoking.309 Participants were contacted
again a week later to test how well they recalled the warnings they saw.310
Based on the study’s results, as well as public comments and scientific
literature, the FDA issued a final rule selecting nine of the images.311 The
images are not timid. For example, one depicts a man exhaling cigarette
smoke through a tracheotomy hole in his neck.312 Another shows a healthy
pair of lungs next to a diseased pair.313 Another depicts a corpse with postautopsy staples down the middle of his chest.314

304. Id. at 567 (citing World Health Org., WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 10
(2003) (calling for warnings that cover fifty percent of more of packages’ principal display areas)).
305. Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 552–54, 558–59.
306. Id. at 559.
307. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,636 (June 22, 2011); see also Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75
Fed. Reg. 69524 (Nov. 12, 2010) (proposing graphic images).
308. 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,638.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June
22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). The warnings, including the graphic images, are available at
FDA, Tobacco Products, Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/
Labeling/Labeling/CigaretteWarningLabels/ucm259214.htm (last visited April 9, 2013).
312. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,649.
313. Id. at 36,651.
314. Id. at 36,654–55.
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Tobacco companies brought a suit in federal court in the District of
Columbia to stop the government from requiring them to put these images
on their product packaging and in their advertising.315 By a 2-1 vote, the
D.C. Circuit affirmed a district court ruling in favor of the tobacco
companies, concluding that the FDA had chosen images that were too
emotional and did not merely convey neutral facts.316 The D.C. Circuit
majority noted that Zauderer provides a very deferential standard of judicial
review for laws requiring disclosure of factual and uncontroversial
information.317 But in the court’s view, the FDA’s graphics crossed the line
into government advocacy of controversial opinions.318 Unlike the
disclosure requirements approved in cases like Zauderer, the FDA’s
graphic warnings were not designed to remedy any specific attempt by
tobacco companies to mislead consumers.319 Moreover, the graphic
warnings did not merely convey accurate and uncontroversial information.
The FDA instead admitted that the images were “primarily intended to
evoke an emotional response, or, at most, shock the viewer.”320 Some of the
images (such as a picture of a woman crying) conveyed no warning
information of any sort.321 Others could be misinterpreted by consumers.
For example, the image of a man smoking through a tracheotomy hole
would be factual if the government were trying to tell people that
tracheotomies are a common result of smoking.322 But the government’s
real point was that smoking is addictive, and the image was an
unnecessarily subjective and emotional way of making that point.323
The D.C. Circuit majority concluded that the case fell outside the
parameters of Zauderer and therefore Central Hudson’s intermediate
scrutiny test applied.324 In the court’s view, the FDA did not satisfy Central
Hudson because it had no proof that including the proposed graphics in
tobacco product warnings would actually advance the government’s interest

315. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff’g 845 F.
Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012), and vacating 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011).
316. Id. at 1216–17.
317. Id. at 1213.
318. Id. at 1216.
319. Id. at 1215–16.
320. Id. at 1216.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1217. The dissenting member of the court disagreed on this point, contending that
Zauderer applied because the government intended the graphic warnings to counteract the tobacco
companies’ long history of deceiving the public about the risks of smoking. See id. at 1222–23 (Rogers,
J., dissenting).
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in reducing smoking.325 The FDA referenced studies suggesting that graphic
warnings encouraged Canadian and Australian youth smokers to think more
about quitting, but no evidence indicated whether those thoughts led to
actual reductions in smoking.326 Indeed, the FDA’s own estimates suggested
that the graphic warnings would reduce smoking rates by less than onetenth of one percent—a statistically insignificant amount.327 The court thus
criticized the graphics for being too inflammatory and alarmist, but
simultaneously suggested that there was no reason to assume that they
would stop a significant number of people from smoking.328
The D.C. Circuit opinion also tentatively embraced the broader
proposition that the government should not be trying to dissuade people
from purchasing a legal product.329 The court assumed for the sake of
argument that the FDA had a legitimate interest in reducing smoking rates,
but noted that “we are skeptical that the government can assert a substantial
interest in discouraging consumers from purchasing a lawful product, even
one that has been conclusively linked to adverse health consequences.”330
Contrary to that suggestion, however, there is no rule of law that forbids the
government from attempting to discourage legal activities. For example, the
government unveiled a nationwide anti-smoking campaign in 2012,
spending $54 million on a series of advertisements “highlighting the grisly
toll of smoking.”331 Likewise, no serious constitutional objection could be
made to programs in public schools that aggressively proselytize against
smoking and go well beyond merely teaching neutral information about
tobacco.332 Of course, one might distinguish those efforts as involving the
government’s own speech rather than infringements on the tobacco

325. Id. at 1219–21.
326. Id. at 1219.
327. Id. at 1220. The FDA estimates that even this small decrease in smoking rates would
translate into about 4,000 fewer people smoking, for an overall welfare gain of $500 million to $4.7
billion. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36628, 36724
(June 22, 2011).
328. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216–17.
329. Id. at 1218 & n.13.
330. Id. This was a central premise of the district court’s ruling in the case. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 275 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Although an interest in informing or
educating the public about the dangers of smoking might be compelling, an interest in simply advocating
that the public not purchase a legal product is not.”).
331. Gardiner Harris, U.S. Backs Antismoking Ad Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/health/policy/cdc-finances-nationwide-antismoking-ad-campaigna-first.html.
332. See Ctrs. for Disease Control, Guidelines for School Health Programs to Prevent Tobacco
Use and Addiction, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP., Feb. 25, 1994, at 8 (calling for programs
that “use a variety of educational techniques to decrease the social acceptability of tobacco use”).
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companies’ freedom of expression.333 But while many of the Supreme
Court’s decisions about commercial speech reflect a deeply anti-paternalist
impulse, none go so far as to say that the government cannot try to
discourage use of a legal product.334
The D.C. Circuit’s decision sparked immediate speculation that the
U.S. Supreme Court would agree to hear the case.335 If the Supreme Court
does so, it would have the opportunity to resolve important general
questions about commercial speech analysis in addition to determining the
validity of the graphic warnings for tobacco. In particular, the case revealed
a split among judges over what test should apply to government-mandated
disclosures that fall outside the scope of Zauderer. The district court
contended that Zauderer applies only to disclosure of purely factual and
uncontroversial information, and that strict scrutiny must apply to any
compelled disclosures going beyond that.336 In other words, the district
judge treated strict scrutiny as the general rule, and Zauderer as a narrow
exception to it. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that some courts have
endorsed that view, but instead concluded that Central Hudson’s
intermediate scrutiny standard is the fallback rule for disclosures that are
not sufficiently accurate or uncontroversial to fit within Zauderer’s
protection.337
Neither Zauderer nor any other Supreme Court decision clearly
explains what test should apply to laws requiring disclosure of information
that is not entirely factual or uncontroversial.338 But the more sensible
approach is to apply the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson rather
than strict scrutiny. Central Hudson provides the general rule for
commercial speech rights, and Zauderer carves out an exception to it. If the
disclosure requirements go beyond what Zauderer can support, the analysis

333. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211–12.
334. See supra Part I-E.
335. See Ricardo Carvajal & J.P. Ellison, D.C. Circuit Affirms District Court Decision Striking
Down FDA Regulation Requiring Graphic Warnings on Cigarette Packages, FDA LAW BLOG (Aug. 28,
2012),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/08/dc-circuit-affirms-districtcourt-decision-striking-down-fda-regulation-requiring-graphic-warnings-o.html (asserting that the
Supreme Court is almost certain to take the case); see also Troutman Sanders, Cigarette Warning Label
Dispute Headed for High Court?, TROUTMAN SANDERS TOBACCO LAW, www.tobaccolawblog.com/
2012/11/cigarette-warning-label-dispute-headed-to-high-court/ (last visited April 9, 2013) (explaining
that the case is ripe for Supreme Court review).
336. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 46 (D.D.C. 2011).
337. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217. The court noted that the Sixth Circuit and Seventh Circuit
treat strict scrutiny as the alternative to Zauderer. Id. (citing Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v.
United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554 (6th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Oct. 26,
2012) (No. 12-521, 12A102); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006)).
338. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
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should revert to what Central Hudson requires, not revert to the realm of
strict scrutiny.
Again, the Zauderer opinion does not clearly address this point. It
does, however, emphasize the difficulty of drawing the line between what is
factual and what is not.339 The Court pointed out that “distinguishing
deceptive from nondeceptive advertising in virtually any field of commerce
may require resolution of exceedingly complex and technical factual issues
and the consideration of nice questions of semantics.”340 In other words, one
often finds a hazy middle ground, rather than a bright line, between truth
and falsehood or between fact and opinion. That does not mean the
distinction between purely factual information and other statements is
entirely unhelpful and should be excluded from the analysis. But it does
counsel in favor of not overemphasizing the distinction. If a court decides
that a disclosure goes slightly beyond pure and uncontroversial facts, that
impurity should not shift the analysis all the way from what is essentially a
rational or reasonable basis review under Zauderer to full-blown strict
scrutiny. That is a dramatic swing from a highly deferential, lenient
standard to a very demanding one.
Applying strict scrutiny to compelled disclosures that fall outside
Zauderer also runs counter to the Supreme Court’s frequent suggestion that
disclosure requirements pose much less of a threat to First Amendment
values than speech restrictions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
urged governments to consider mandating disclosures as a less burdensome
alternative to regulating what advertisers can say.341 For example, in cases
about restrictions on lawyer advertising, the Court has emphasized that “the
preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less.”342 In other words, a
state concerned about legal advertising should compel speech, by requiring
attorneys to insert appropriate disclaimers or explanations into their ads,
rather than restricting what lawyers say.343 Applying strict scrutiny to
disclosures that step beyond Zauderer would have the odd effect of
subjecting many disclosure or warning requirements, like the graphic
339. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
645 (1985).
340. Id.
341. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002) (suggesting that
requiring warnings about compounded drugs would be a less restrictive alternative to banning ads for
the drugs); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980)
(suggesting that the government should require more disclosure of information rather than banning
advertising by electric utility companies).
342. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977).
343. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (“[T]he remedy in the first instance is not
necessarily a prohibition but preferably a requirement of disclaimers or explanation.”).
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components of the FDA’s tobacco warnings, to much tougher scrutiny than
commercial speech restrictions typically receive under Central Hudson.
Hearing the case about the tobacco warnings would also enable the
Supreme Court to underscore the importance of being realistic and evenhanded about the expressive significance of visual images. The Court has
previously recognized that “[t]he use of illustrations or pictures in
advertisements serves important communicative functions: it attracts the
attention of the audience to the advertiser’s message, and it may also serve
to impart information directly.”344 Images in commercial advertising
therefore receive the same level of constitutional protection as verbal
messages.345
The Supreme Court should confirm that the visual aspect of expression
is significant not only for advertisers, but also for the government’s efforts
to craft effective warnings or other disclosures. The Sixth Circuit struck
down the statutory provision prohibiting manufacturers from using colors
and graphics, finding that the use of colors and graphics “has great
expressive value for the tobacco industry” and protecting the industry’s
ability to use colors and images to attract consumers’ attention.346
Meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the FDA’s chosen graphics,
belittling the notion that the government would need to use vivid imagery to
drive home a message to consumers about the severity of tobacco’s
dangers.347 The net result is that courts have given great weight to the
tobacco companies’ need for visual flair in their product promotions, while
essentially telling the government that plain text is all that is required to
make its point.
If the case about the tobacco warnings reaches the Supreme Court, the
result will obviously depend not only on the justices’ overall outlooks on
protection of commercial speech, but also on their more specific sentiments
about tobacco. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion, for example, emphasized that
tobacco is a uniquely destructive product. “[T]here are ways for a person to
drink beer, watch R-rated movies, buy lottery tickets, and drive fast cars,
that do not necessarily cause harm to that person,” the court noted, but there
is no healthy or safe way to use tobacco.348 On the other hand, the D.C.
Circuit essentially concluded that people should be allowed to make up
344. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647 (striking down state ban on use of illustrations in advertising by
lawyers).
345. Id.
346. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 547 (2012), petition for
cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Oct. 26, 2012) (No. 12-521, 12A102).
347. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
348. Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 547.
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their own minds about tobacco use and the government should not be trying
to “browbeat consumers into quitting.”349 Tobacco thus provides a crucial
test of the limits of commercial speech protection as well as paternalistic
government efforts to steer individuals away from unhealthy choices.
C. Cell Phones
Cell phones certainly do not have as sinister a reputation as tobacco.
They may be addictive in some sense, but only by virtue of being useful and
enjoyable devices.350 Nevertheless, a bitter dispute has arisen in California
over what information should be provided to those considering the purchase
of a cell phone. Cell phones emit radio frequency energy, a form of
electromagnetic radiation.351 The cell phone user’s body absorbs some of
that radiation, particularly at the head and neck because those are close to
where the phone is typically held during use.352 Because some types of
radiation (such as X-rays or radon) increase the risk of developing cancer,
concerns exist that cell phones could pose a cancer risk as well.353
Scientific studies have not found a consistent link between cancer and
cell phone use.354 Unlike forms of radiation known to be carcinogenic,
radiofrequency does not appear to damage DNA in animal or human
cells.355 Likewise, epidemiologic studies have generally not found a
connection between cell phone use and incidence of cancer.356 Exceptions
do exist, however, and therefore the issue is not entirely free from scientific
controversy. For example, a large international study found no overall link
between cell phone use and brain tumors, but observed a statistically
significant increase in the risk of glioma (a deadly type of brain or spinal
tumor) among the one-tenth of the study subjects who reported having spent

349. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217.
350. See Cynthia Hubert, When Cell Phone Love Becomes Hang-Up, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2005,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-06-13/features/0506130079_1_cell-phones-addictionresearchers (describing the widespread and growing dependence on electronic devices).
351. See Cell Phones and Cancer Risk Fact Sheet, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/cellphones (last reviewed June 18, 2012).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. See, e.g., Hirose H. Suhara et al., Mobile Phone Base Station Radiation Does Not Affect
Neoplastic Transformation in BALB/3T3 Cells, 29 BIOELECTROMAGNETICS 55, 63 (2008) (examining
the effects of RF field exposure on cellular functions of BALB/3T3 cells); B.C. Zook & S.J. Simmens,
The Effects of Pulsed 860 MHz Radiofrequency Radiation on the Promotion of Neurogenic Tumors in
Rats, 165 RADIATION RESEARCH 608 (2006).
356. NAT’L CANCER INST., supra note 351.
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the most time talking on cell phones.357 The researchers deemed their
evidence on this point to be inconclusive, noting a variety of potential
weaknesses in their data,358 but nevertheless concluded that “[t]he
possibility of raised risk in heavy users of mobile phones is an important
issue because of their ever-increasing use.”359 The bulk of the available
scientific evidence thus suggests that cell phones are safe, but scientists
agree that more research should be conducted, particularly because cell
phone technology and use patterns continue to evolve.360
In light of this tension, some legislators in California decided that
consumers should be given more information about the issue. After an
unsuccessful attempt to pass legislation at the state level, the mayor and
board of supervisors in San Francisco took up the cause.361 In the summer
of 2010, the city became the first place in the nation requiring disclosures
regarding the amount of radio frequency energy absorbed by cell phone
users.362 Specifically, the San Francisco ordinance required retailers to
provide educational materials and post the Specific Absorption Rate (SAR)
value, a measure of radio frequency energy absorbed by the body, for each
type of phone sold.363
In drafting the warning materials, city officials relied upon information
from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) website.364 The FCC
soon revised its materials to disclaim any suggestion that phones with lower
SAR values are safer than those with higher SAR values.365 In response,
San Francisco altered its approach and amended the ordinance to drop the
357. INTERPHONE Study Group, Brain Tumor Risk in Relation to Mobile Telephone Use:
Results of the INTERPHONE International Case-Control Study, 39 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 675, 685–88
(2012).
358. For example, the researchers noted that the increased risk of glioma showed up only for
those in the top decile of cell phone users (i.e., the one-tenth reporting the highest cumulative time spent
on cell phone calls), rather than showing an upward trend across the first nine deciles of users. Id. at
687.
359. Id. at 688.
360. Id.
361. Rachel Gordon, Supes Back Posting of Cell Phone Emission Levels, S.F. CHRON., June 16,
2010,
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Supes-back-posting-of-cell-phone-emission-levels3185404.php. A bill requiring warnings on cell phones was also introduced in the Maine legislature in
2010, but it was not enacted. See L.D. 1706, 124th Leg., 2d Sess. (Me. 2010).
362. Gordon, supra note 361.
363. See CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054,
1056 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, Nos. 11-17707, 11-17773, 2012
WL 3900689 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2012).
364. Id. at 1056.
365. Id. The FCC prohibits the sale of cell phones with SAR values exceeding 1.6 watts per
kilogram. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.1093(d)(2) (2012) (setting exposure limits at 1.6 W/kg); FED. COMMC’N
COMM., SAR FOR CELL PHONES: WHAT IT MEANS FOR YOU 1–2 (2011), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/sar.pdf.
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disclosure requirement for SAR values and to remove references to
“radiation.”366 The amended ordinance focused on advising consumers
about ways to reduce bodily absorption of radio frequency energy and
required the dissemination of this message through three means: posters,
fact sheets, and stickers.367 First, the law required each retailer to display a
small poster stating that cell phones emit radio frequency energy, that
“[s]tudies continue to assess potential health effects of mobile phone use,”
and that cell phone users can reduce their exposure by using a headset or
speakerphone.368 Second, the ordinance required retailers to give each
phone purchaser (and any shopper who requested it) a small fact sheet with
a more detailed explanation of the city’s recommendations for reducing
exposure to radio frequency energy.369 Finally, the ordinance required
retailers to paste small stickers on promotional materials displayed adjacent
to phones in stores.370 The stickers would state that cell phone users’ bodies
absorb radio frequency energy, and encourage interested customers to
request the city’s fact sheet for more information about ways to reduce
exposure.371
City leaders did not explicitly claim that cell phones cause cancer or
any other health problem. Instead, they based their action on the existence
of uncertainty.372 Although scientific studies had not proven a link between
cell phones and cancer, neither had they definitely ruled out such a link.373
The ordinance explained that San Francisco believes in the “Precautionary
Principle, which provides that the government should not wait for scientific
proof of a health or safety risk before taking steps to inform the public of
the potential for harm.”374 The ordinance’s proponents emphasized that the
information would merely help consumers make informed choices. “This is
not about discouraging people from using their cell phones,” the mayor’s
office explained.375 “This is a modest and commonsense measure to provide
greater transparency and information to consumers.”376

366. CTIA, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1057; Defendant City and County of San Francisco’s Opposition
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6–8, CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of
San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-03224 WHA).
367. CTIA, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1056.
370. Id. at 1058.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Gordon, supra note 361.
376. Id.
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The cell phone industry, through its international trade association,
filed a lawsuit in federal court in San Francisco seeking to enjoin
enforcement of the ordinance.377 At the trial level, Judge William Alsup
ruled in favor of the industry on most points.378 The decision illustrated how
a court can strive to balance commercial speech interests and governmental
concerns.
Judge Alsup recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Zauderer
was a key precedent, because San Francisco sought to compel speech rather
than restrict it.379 If the ordinance had merely required disclosure of
accurate and uncontroversial facts, the government would have faced only
the low hurdle posed by the Zauderer test and would have prevailed if the
required disclosures were “reasonably related” to the government’s interest
in informing the public about a potential safety issue.380
The case, however, demonstrates that it is not always easy to decide
what constitutes an accurate and uncontroversial fact. Judge Alsup observed
that whether cell phones cause cancer is a “debatable question,” but San
Francisco’s ordinance “deftly dodged” this problem by not making any
definitive statement about cancer risks.381 Indeed, Judge Alsup concluded
that San Francisco’s required disclosures consist entirely of true
statements.382 For example, no one disputes that cell phones emit radio
frequency energy, that the user’s body absorbs some of this energy, or that
the energy absorption can be reduced by using a headset or speaker or by
spending less time using the phone.383
One might think that would be the end of the story. But Judge Alsup
was troubled that the statements in San Francisco’s disclosure materials,
“all of which seem to be literally true,” nevertheless added up to a
misleading message.384 The disclosures consisted of “a series of factoids”
that were each “accurate or at least [had] some anchor in the scientific
377. The industry initially attacked the ordinance only on federal preemption grounds, but later
amended its complaint to assert a First Amendment claim as well. Compare First Amended Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-03224 WHA), with Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, 5, CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-03224 WHA).
378. CTIA, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1062–63.
379. Id. at 1059–60.
380. Id. at 1059; see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
381. CTIA, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.
382. Id. at 1060, 1062.
383. Id. at 1062; see also Carleigh Cooper, Cell Phones and the Dark Deception, 23 SYRACUSE
SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 147,161 (2010) (describing various methods to limit absorption of radiofrequency
given off by cell phones).
384. CTIA, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1060, 1062.
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literature” but together created an “overall message” or “overall
impression” that was misleading.385 In Judge Alsup’s view, the disclosures
would tend to make people think that cell phones are dangerous and that
they are not regulated by the FCC or any other government agency.386
Judge Alsup was particularly troubled by a sentence on San
Francisco’s fact sheet stating that the World Health Organization (WHO)
has classified radio frequency energy as a “possible carcinogen.”387 The
WHO maintains lists of substances that are carcinogenic or probably
carcinogenic, but the evidence of a danger was insufficient for radio
frequency energy to make either of those lists.388 The WHO instead put
radio frequency energy on its “possible” carcinogen list, and according to
Judge Alsup, “it does not take much to list something as ‘possible.’”389
Indeed, he pointed out, the WHO has also listed coffee and pickled
vegetables as possible carcinogens.390
While focusing on coffee and pickles makes it sound like the WHO
will put virtually anything on its possibly-carcinogenic list, the compilation
of the lists is far from reckless.391 The WHO assembles working groups of
reputable scientists with appropriate expertise.392 To put an item on the
possibly-carcinogenic list, the scientists must find some evidence of
carcinogenicity, whether it comes from studies of humans, experiments on
animals, or other relevant data.393 For example, a substance will be
classified as possibly carcinogenic if epidemiological studies produce
“limited evidence” of carcinogenicity in humans.394 The possibly
385. Id.
386. Id. at 1062.
387. Id. at 1058, 1062.
388. Id. at 1060.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. In addition to coffee and pickles, the WHO’s list of possible carcinogens includes a few
familiar substances like lead, gasoline, engine exhaust, and welding fumes. WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
INT’L AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, AGENTS CLASSIFIED BY THE IARC MONOGRAPHS,
VOLUMES 1-106, at 9–17 (2012), available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Classification/index.php.
Most items on the list are chemicals like anthraquinone, carbon tetrachloride, dibrommoacetic acid,
vinyl acetate, and the controversial pesticide DDT. Id. Occupational settings with substantial exposure to
potentially hazardous substances have also been categorized as possibly carcinogenic, including
carpentry, dry cleaning, and firefighting. Id.
392. WORLD HEALTH ORG., INT’L AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, IARC MONOGRAPHS
ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISK TO HUMANS PREAMBLE 4 (2006), available at
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Preamble/CurrentPreamble.pdf (describing the selection criteria for
working group members and how other invited specialists and national and international health agencies
have the opportunity to participate).
393. Id. at 23. Other relevant evidence could include mechanistic data suggesting the means or
process by which the substance causes cancer to develop. See id. at 15–18.
394. Id. at 23.
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carcinogenic classification thus requires some indication that the substance
might cause cancer, albeit significantly less than it would take to make the
organization’s carcinogenic or probably-carcinogenic lists. The WHO noted
that its decision to put radio frequency energy on the possibly-carcinogenic
list was based largely on the study finding an increased risk of glioma for
those making the most extensive use of cell phones.395
Judge Alsup sensibly feared that the public would misunderstand what
it means to be listed as a possible carcinogen and overestimate the danger
presented.396 But rather than simply invalidating the San Francisco
ordinance, Judge Alsup specified edits that would cure the fact sheet’s
constitutional flaws.397 For example, he proposed revising the fact sheet to
include a statement explaining that all cell phones sold in the United States
must comply with radiofrequency energy emission limits set by the FCC.398
To avoid any possible misunderstanding created by the reference to the
WHO’s list, the judge proposed amending the fact sheet further to say that
“RF Energy has been classified by the World Health Organization as a
possible carcinogen rather than as a known carcinogen or a probable
carcinogen and studies continue to assess the potential health effects of cell
phones.”399
Judge Alsup also objected to the illustrations that San Francisco
proposed to put on the fact sheet and on the poster that cell phone retailers
would be required to display.400 The graphics consisted of two human
silhouettes, one with a cell phone next to the head and one with a cell phone
in a hand near the figure’s hip.401 Each phone was surrounded by red,
orange, and yellow concentric circles “radiating from the phones into the
bodies.”402 Judge Alsup noted that images are always “subject to
interpretation” and that the colored circles emanating from the cell phones
might be interpreted in a variety of ways.403 For example, consumers might
interpret the images simply to mean that cell phones emit radio frequency
energy, because the images on the poster appear directly under the heading
“Cell Phones Emit Radio-frequency Energy,” and the images on the fact
sheet appear below the heading: “You can limit exposure to Radio395. Electromagnetic Fields and Public Health: Mobile Phones: Fact Sheet No. 193, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (June 2011), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs193/en/.
396. CTIA, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1063.
401. Id. at 1058.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1063.
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frequency (RF) Energy from your cell phone.”404 If understood that way,
the images communicate an accurate and uncontroversial message, for no
one disputes that cell phones emit radio frequency energy and that a cell
phone user’s body absorbs some of that energy.405 But Judge Alsup
concluded that the images should be deleted because some consumers
might interpret them to mean that cell phones are dangerous.406 The images
were “too much opinion and too little fact.”407
Like the D.C. Circuit in the litigation about the FDA’s graphic images
for tobacco warnings, Judge Alsup interpreted the Supreme Court’s
decision in Zauderer in a way that makes it difficult for governments to
require the inclusion of images in mandated disclosures.408 Again, Zauderer
established that the government can require a commercial speaker to
disclose accurate and uncontroversial facts if the disclosure is reasonably
related to the interests the government seeks to achieve.409 But in Judge
Alsup’s view, a graphic image cannot be considered accurate and
uncontroversial if there is a “plausible” way to interpret the image that
would make it inaccurate or controversial.410 In other words, to qualify for
the relaxed scrutiny available under Zauderer, the government would be
obligated to come up with an image that is not susceptible to any reasonable
misinterpretation or misunderstanding. That is likely to be an extremely
tough standard for the government to satisfy.
Having re-written San Francisco’s fact sheet and ruled out its use of
graphic images, Judge Alsup went on to invalidate the city’s poster and
sticker requirements.411 He concluded that a “large wall poster is not
reasonably necessary and would unduly intrude on the retailers’ wall
space.”412 Retailers, the judge added, should not be forced “to convert their
404. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, 20, CTIA—The
Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv03224 WHA).
405. See NAT’L CANCER INST., supra note 351 and accompanying text.
406. CTIA, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
407. Id.
408. See supra notes 316–347 and accompanying text.
409. For discussion of Zauderer, see supra note 96 and accompanying text. In one respect,
Judge Alsup interpreted Zauderer in a way that favors governments. Although Zauderer talks only about
situations where the government requires disclosures to offset commercial speech that would otherwise
deceive consumers, Judge Alsup read Zauderer as also supplying the test for government disclosures
meant to serve purposes other than preventing deception. See CTIA, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1059 (“[T]he
First Amendment permits a government to require businesses to disclosure accurate and uncontroversial
facts as long as the disclosures are reasonably related to a governmental interest in preventing deception
or in protecting public health and safety, among other allowable objectives.”).
410. CTIA, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
411. Id.
412. Id.
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walls to billboards for the municipal message.”413 Likewise, requiring
retailers to put a sticker on their display materials, even a sticker merely
stating that cell phone users’ bodies absorb radio frequency energy, would
“unduly intrude” on the retailers’ commercial messages.414 “San Francisco
cannot paste its municipal message over the message of the retailers,” Judge
Alsup concluded.415
Those conclusions overstate the burden imposed by San Francisco’s
ordinance. The required poster was only eleven by seventeen inches in
size.416 A person cannot reasonably describe a poster no larger than two
pieces of paper as being a large wall poster, let alone a billboard. The
ordinance required each retailer to put up a single copy of the poster, not to
plaster them all over the store.417 The stickers for cell phone display
materials were just one by two-and-a-half inches in size.418 That is about the
size of a stick of chewing gum. Again, that hardly seems like an undue
intrusion on the retailers’ communication with customers.
Indeed, Judge Alsup seemed to give little weight to the fact that San
Francisco’s ordinance left cell phone companies completely free to express
whatever arguments or information they might want to share with
consumers about the safety of their products. In other words, while San
Francisco sought to compel the disclosure of certain information, it did not
impose any restriction on the affected business’s own speech. San Francisco
specifically avowed that it would not object to any company’s decision “to
disseminate any message they want, including disagreement with any
aspect of, or implication of, the City’s message.”419 A store thus would be
free to make up its own posters, fact sheets, and stickers rebutting
everything in the city’s materials and telling consumers about the extensive
federal regulation of cell phones and all the scientific studies that have
found no link between cell phone use and any health danger.
Of course, the counterargument would be that even if San Francisco’s
ordinance is unconstitutional, the city remains free to disseminate messages
about cell phones through independent means. San Francisco could put big
signs about cell phone safety on every city bus, hang posters throughout
every city building, and even run informational ads in newspapers and on
413. Id.
414. Id. at 1064.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 1058.
417. Id. at 1057.
418. Id. at 1058.
419. Defendant City and County of San Francisco’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 2, 14, CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 827 F.
Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-03224 WHA).
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television and radio. The city could promote its message about cell phones
in all of those ways, but it would have to do the work itself, rather than
forcing cell phone providers to disseminate the city’s message. San
Francisco would argue, however, that it makes an enormous difference for
it to be able to present its message in stores at the time of purchase, because
that is the moment when the city has the best chance of attracting the
consumer’s attention to information relating to cell phones. The issue is a
genuinely close one, with good arguments on both sides, proving once
again the need for judicial analysis that looks realistically at the overall
balance of interests and consequences.
While Judge Alsup essentially tried to split the difference between the
two sides’ positions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit came
down squarely on the side of the industry.420 In a terse, unpublished
opinion, the Ninth Circuit found that San Francisco’s proposed fact sheet
contained “misleading and controversial” information and therefore was not
the sort of disclosure requirement protected by Zauderer.421 Moreover, the
court concluded that even Judge Alsup’s revised version of the fact sheet
contained more than just pure, uncontroversial facts.422 The information on
the sheet, such as recommendations about how to reduce radio frequency
energy exposure, “could prove to be interpreted by consumers as expressing
San Francisco’s opinion that using cell phones is dangerous.”423 The Ninth
Circuit thus enjoined enforcement of San Francisco’s entire ordinance.424
The Ninth Circuit not only construed Zauderer narrowly, but also
failed to even address the possibility that some or all of San Francisco’s
disclosure requirements could survive under Central Hudson’s test, strict
scrutiny, or whatever other analysis might apply to disclosures stepping
beyond Zauderer’s limits. The Ninth Circuit judges showed no hint of
concern for the interests motivating San Francisco’s ordinance or the
simple, practical realities underlying the legal issues. Imagine asking a wide
array of Americans to name the significant problems facing the nation
today. No matter how far and wide you searched, you would be hard
pressed to find anyone worrying that Americans are too reluctant to
purchase and use cell phones. At most, being informed or reminded that cell
phones emit a type of radiation would inspire some consumers to be a little

420. CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, Nos. 11-17707, 11-17773,
2012 WL 3900689, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2012).
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
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more cautious about how they use these beloved devices.425 Allowing San
Francisco to require some type of disclosure, but with a moderate tone
along the lines of what Judge Alsup proposed, would have been a
reasonable way to accommodate government, business, and consumer
interests.426
D. Restaurant Menus
The marketing of unhealthy foods and beverages may soon be the
hottest of all topics in the battle over commercial speech rights. Obesity
rates in the United States have increased significantly over the past three
decades.427 More than one-third of adults are obese, and another one-third
are overweight.428 Obesity increases the risk of a variety of health problems,
including heart disease, strokes, diabetes, hypertension, and certain types of
cancer.429 Although the causes of the nation’s obesity epidemic are difficult
to determine with certainty, the types and amounts of food that people
consume obviously play some role.430
Clarence Thomas offered an early warning that paternalistic legislators
or regulators would eventually threaten commercial speech rights in an
effort to improve Americans’ diets. When the Court struck down
restrictions on tobacco advertising in Lorillard,431 Thomas foresaw that
food advertising would be the next target.432 While tobacco companies have
been accused of secretly trying to lure underage customers, food companies
openly and aggressively target children with promotions like McDonald’s

425. Microwave ovens provide a useful example. The FDA believes that the radiation involved
in microwave cooking does not pose a health threat. But the agency nevertheless makes the commonsense recommendation that “[a]s an added safety precaution,” no one should stand directly against a
microwave oven for long periods while it is operating. Radiation-Emitting Products, Microwave Oven
Radiation, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/ResourcesforYouRadiationEmitting
Products/ucm252762.htm (last updated Apr. 26, 2011).
426. If the FCC finds that state or local disclosure requirements pose a serious problem, the
federal government can exercise its power to preempt them. See CTIA, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1059 (noting
that federal law already preempts state or local regulation of cell phones’ radiofrequency emissions).
427. See Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults, 1999–
2008, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 235, 240 (2010) (reporting that obesity rates were relatively stable in the
1960s and 1970s, increased significantly in the 1980s and 1990s, and leveled off or increased at a slower
pace in the 2000s).
428. Id. at 236.
429. Id. at 240.
430. See id. at 240–41(discussing how programs that promote healthier eating will likely lead to
overall improvements in the obesity issues facing the United States).
431. See supra notes 140–145 and accompanying text.
432. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 587–88 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
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Happy Meals.433 Thomas called for courts to be firm in their defense of
commercial speech rights, even when it means giving constitutional shelter
to the marketing of extremely harmful products, because the First
Amendment protects bad ideas as well as good ones.434
If there is a slippery slope from tobacco advertising restrictions to new
restraints on food marketing, many public health advocates are eager to see
governments take that slide. In their view, obesity is quickly replacing
tobacco as the nation’s greatest public health threat. As with tobacco,
dealing with obesity will require an enormous change in both attitudes and
regulations.435 A wide array of regulations could be imagined, ranging from
advertising restrictions—like the ban on broadcast advertising of
tobacco436—to disclosure requirements—like the Surgeon General’s
warnings on tobacco packaging.437
As demonstrated by the furor over Mayor Bloomberg’s proposed ban
on big sodas, such regulations will be intensely controversial.438 Many
people view weight problems as primarily a matter of individual choice and
personal responsibility, while others are more inclined to emphasize
environmental or societal factors like food advertising’s manipulation of
consumer choices.439
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, informally known as
Obamacare, may give courts an important opportunity to weigh in on the
issue. Section 4205 of the Act requires restaurant chains with twenty or
more locations to start listing the calorie count for each item on their
menus, including the big menu boards typically behind the counter and by
the drive-through lane of fast food restaurants.440 The new law imposes a
433. Id. at 588.
434. Id. at 590; see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 48 n.26, 52
(D.D.C. 2011) (warning that if courts do not adequately protect tobacco companies’ commercial speech,
the government will curtail the rights of the food and alcohol industries). In their appellate brief
concerning the FDA’s graphic warnings, see supra Part II-B, the tobacco companies made the same
argument by creating hypothetical warnings for food and alcohol packages, such as a McDonald’s bag
with the FDA’s image of a cadaver accompanying a warning about heart disease. Brief for Appellees at
32–33, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2012) (No. 11-5332).
435. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Klein & William Dietz, Childhood Obesity: The New Tobacco, 29
HEALTH AFF. 388, 388, 390 (2010) (arguing that obesity epidemic demands a public health social
movement similar to the one aimed at tobacco).
436. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 264–268 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 5–16 and accompanying text.
439. See Colleen L. Barry et al., Obesity Metaphors: How Beliefs About the Causes of Obesity
Affect Support for Public Policy, 87 MILBANK Q. 7, 7, 18, 38 (2009) (reporting results of survey on how
public perceptions of obesity shape opinions on policies like requiring warnings on food packaging or
restricting food advertising aimed at children).
440. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b), 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H) (2012).
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similar requirement for food vending machines.441 In addition to the calorie
disclosures, the restaurants also must post “a succinct statement concerning
suggested daily caloric intake” designed to help the public understand the
significance of the calorie counts in relation to an overall daily diet.442 The
restaurants also must have written materials available that provide more
detailed nutritional information about each item on their menus, such as
sodium, carbohydrate, and fat levels, and give those materials to any
customers who request them.443 These new statutory requirements have not
yet taken effect, as the FDA is still in the process of preparing the
regulations to implement them.444
Should anyone challenge the new federal law on First Amendment
grounds, precedent will be on the government’s side. Several cities and
states already require restaurants to post calorie counts.445 New York City
was the first place in the country to enact such a law, and the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld it as constitutional in a 2009
ruling.446 The court reasoned that calorie counts are the sort of purely
factual and uncontroversial commercial speech covered by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Zauderer.447 As a result, New York City merely needed
to show that requiring restaurants to post calorie data was “reasonably
related” to its goal of reducing obesity.448 The Second Circuit felt that
requirement was easily satisfied, citing evidence that obesity is a serious
problem and that studies have linked obesity to frequent consumption of
high-calorie meals at fast food restaurants.449
While the Second Circuit’s ruling certainly bodes well for the validity
of the new federal law requiring disclosure of calorie counts, the issue is
hardly free from doubt. The Second Circuit treated the Zauderer test, which
requires the mandated disclosure to be reasonably related to the
government’s objective, as equivalent to the weakest sort of rational basis
441. Id. § 343(q)(5)(H)(viii).
442. Id. § 343(q)(5)(H)(ii)(I)(bb), (II)(bb).
443. Id. § 343(q)(5)(H)(ii)(III).
444. See Implement Section 4205 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, FDA,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/FDATrack/track-proj?program=healthcare-reform&id=ACA-4205Implementation (last visited April 9, 2013) (providing timetable for development of the regulations).
445. See, e.g., State and Local Menu Labeling Policies, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST
(Apr. 2011), http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/ml_map.pdf (displaying the status of state and local menu
labeling policies).
446. N.Y. State Restaurant Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2008).
447. Id. at 134.
448. Id. at 136; see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(explaining that advertisers’ rights are adequately protected if there is a reasonable relationship between
disclosure and state’s interests).
449. N.Y. State Restaurant Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 135–36.
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review.450 New York City therefore needed merely to offer a plausible
theory as to how posting calorie counts might help to prevent obesity.451 In
other words, the city prevailed because one could reasonably imagine that
the calorie disclosures might encourage someone to eat less and lose
weight, and it did not matter that the city had no proof that the law would
actually have such an effect.
If a court required strong proof of the effectiveness of calorie
disclosure laws, the outlook for such laws would be bleak. Studies have
produced mixed results rather than clear answers. For example, some
researchers measuring the effects of New York City’s law have found that
the posting of calorie information had no significant effect on what
customers purchased.452 Indeed, some evidence suggests that having more
information about the nutritional content of menu items will actually drive
customers away from the healthier options.453 Other studies have produced
somewhat more encouraging results. They suggest that even though a large
majority of restaurant-goers will disregard the calorie information, the
fifteen or twenty percent of customers who do pay attention to the
information will order significantly fewer calories as a result.454
450. Id. at 134.
451. See id. at 134 n.23 (“New York ‘has no obligation to produce evidence, or empirical data to
sustain . . . rationality.’” (quoting Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 582 (2d Cir. 2001))). For example,
in the equal protection context, rational basis review is satisfied if any reasonably conceivable state of
facts could provide a plausible justification for the government’s action. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns,
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993).
452. Brian Elbel et al., Child and Adolescent Fast-Food Choice and the Influence of Calorie
Labeling: A Natural Experiment, 35 INT’L J. OF OBESITY 493, 497 (2011); see also Brian Elbel et al.,
Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the Effects on Low-Income People in New York
City, 28 HEALTH AFF. w1110, w1117 (2009) (“Even those who indicated that the calorie information
influenced their food choices did not actually purchase fewer calories.”); Eric A. Finkelstein et al.,
Mandatory Menu Labeling in One Fast-Food Chain in King County, Washington, 40 AM. J. OF
PREVENTIVE MED. 122, 125 (2011) (finding no evidence that mandatory menu labeling had a positive
influence on food choices); Lisa J. Harnack, Effects of Calorie Labeling and Value Size Pricing on Fast
Food Meal Choices: Results from an Experimental Trial, 5 INT’L J. OF BEHAVIORAL NUTRITION &
PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 63, 73 (2008) (finding that calorie data on menus caused no significant change in
average calorie content of fast food meal choices).
453. See, e.g., Harnack, supra note 452, at 73 (finding that study data suggested some men
might use calorie information on menus to order “energy dense” higher calorie meals); George
Loewenstein, Confronting Reality: Pitfalls of Calorie Posting, 93 AM. J. OF CLINICAL NUTRITION 679,
680 (2011) (suggesting that calorie disclosures might backfire by causing low-income consumers to
purchase food with the most calories for the price or by causing dieters to realize that food items do not
contain as many calories as they otherwise would have imagined).
454. See Bryan Bollinger et al., Calorie Posting in Chain Restaurants, 3 AM. ECON. J.: ECON.
POL’Y 91, 92 (2011) (finding that calorie postings at Starbucks reduced average calories per order by six
percent); Tamara Dumanovsky et al., Changes in Energy Content of Lunchtime Purchases from Fast
Food Restaurants After Introduction of Calorie Labelling: Cross Sectional Customer Surveys, 343 BRIT.
MED. J. 299 (2011) (finding that even though calorie disclosures produced no overall decline in calories
purchased, the disclosures led to significant reductions at several major restaurant chains and that
the
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With studies pointing in different directions, the constitutionality of
calorie disclosure requirements ultimately depends on the attitude that
judges bring to bear on the question. A court sharing Justice Breyer’s
preference for deferring to legislative decisions about complex and
debatable policy matters would easily uphold such requirements, just as the
Second Circuit upheld New York City’s law.455 But a court demanding to
see solid proof that calorie listings on menus will in fact reduce obesity
could easily conclude that such proof does not exist. The Supreme Court
has shown that sort of skepticism about the justifications for commercial
speech restrictions in cases like Edenfield v. Fane, where the Court faulted
Florida authorities for presenting no studies to support the state’s fears
about in-person solicitation of clients by certified public accountants.456 The
Court wanted real proof that the solicitation ban was necessary, not mere
speculation. Edenfield involved a restriction on speech, rather than a
government-mandated disclosure like the calorie counts, but judges like
Clarence Thomas will want to dissolve that distinction and apply the same
degree of exacting scrutiny to laws that restrict speech and those that
compel it.457
The new federal requirements concerning restaurant menus may
survive simply because no one sues to challenge them. Some restaurant
chains have concluded that posting calorie data is good for business because
fifteen percent of customers who reported using the calorie information purchased an average of 106
fewer calories than those who did not use the information); Elizabeth Pulos & Kirsten Leng, Evaluation
of a Voluntary Menu-Labeling Program in Full-Service Restaurants, 100 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1035,
1037 (2010) (finding that nutrition information on menus caused about twenty percent of full-service
restaurant customers to order an entrée with fewer calories); Christina A. Roberto et al., Evaluating the
Impact of Menu Labeling on Food Choices and Intake, 100 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 312, 316 (2010)
(“Calorie information on restaurant menus reduced the total amount of calories people ordered and
consumed for a meal, improved their ability to estimate calories consumed, and, perhaps most important,
affected their eating later in the day.”); Pooja S. Tandon et al., Nutrition Menu Labeling May Lead to
Lower-Calorie Restaurant Meal Choices for Children, 125 PEDIATRICS 244, 246 (2010), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2010/01/25/peds.2009-1117 (finding that calorie data
on McDonald’s menus did not affect what parents order for themselves, but resulted in an average
reduction of 100 calories in the foods that parents selected for their young children); Julienne A.
Yamamoto et al., Adolescent Fast Food and Restaurant Ordering Behavior With and Without Calorie
and Fat Content Menu Information, 37 J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 397, 402 (2005) (finding that calorie
and fat content data on menus affected the food orders of less than twenty percent of adolescents, but
resulted in a substantial calorie and fat reduction for those orders).
455. See supra notes 446–449 and accompanying text.
456. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993); see supra notes 137, 139, and
accompanying text.
457. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 (2010)
(Thomas J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that there is no constitutional
distinction between government compelling and restricting protected speech and both should be
analyzed under strict scrutiny); see supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
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it pleases customers who want the information.458 Other companies may
decide that given a choice between a federal requirement and a variety of
state and local ones, they would prefer the former. For example, the
National Restaurant Association praised Congress for providing a uniform
national standard to replace the “growing patchwork of varying state and
local regulations.”459
If courts do hear challenges to the new federal rules for menus, the
issues will ultimately boil down once again to a conflict between the Breyer
and Thomas perspectives. Obesity is such a significant problem that some
judges will be inclined to give every benefit of the doubt to governments
trying to do something about it. Others will regard the measure as pointless
and offensive paternalism, concluding that, if the government wants to nag
consumers about what to eat, it can launch its own public education
campaign rather than forcing the restaurant industry to spread the
government’s messages about food choices. Given that it essentially
requires restaurants to disclose objective data, the calorie posting law is
likely to be upheld. But to the extent that governments take the fight against
obesity a step further and attempt to require more aggressive warnings or to
put restrictions on advertising of disfavored foods, the legal conflict over
food sellers’ commercial speech rights will intensify sharply.
CONCLUSION
In one of its early rulings finding commercial speech to be within the
First Amendment’s reach, the Supreme Court emphasized the
“commonsense differences” that distinguish business promotions from the
types of speech receiving the strongest constitutional protection, such as
political expression or news reporting.460 Common sense should continue to
be the guide. Tough questions will always arise and close calls will need to
be made, but courts can maintain a sensible spectrum of scrutiny on which
commercial speech receives some but not the most stringent degree of
protection. A flexible, intermediate analysis can reflect Justice Breyer’s
pragmatic focus on real consequences, and his inclination toward judicial
458. See Georgina Gustin, Menus Soon Will Shed Light on Calorie Load, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Mar. 23, 2010, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/menus-soon-will-shed-light-oncalorie-load/article_001f4ca5-e209-5ce6-ae9d-0d472d197cf9.html.
459. See National Restaurant Association Says Nutrition Information Provision Is Win for
Consumers and Restaurants, NEV. REST. ASS’N (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.nvrestaurants.com/
displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=840 (reprinting National Restaurant Association’s press
release).
460. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 &
n.24 (1976).
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deference to legislative policy determinations. At the same time, the
skepticism of government paternalism favored by judges like Clarence
Thomas can be an ingredient in the analysis as well. Courts should be wary
of government attempts to justify censorship on the grounds that people will
be better off knowing less. While an intermediate approach cannot fully
embrace either the anti-paternalistic or pragmatic perspectives, it can strive
for a fair balance between the two. Embracing a more rigid and extreme
position in one direction or the other might be more satisfying as a matter of
abstract principle. But an intermediate stance offers the best chance to
reasonably accommodate all the interests at stake.

